Thursday, February 21, 2019

Professor Richard Lacey, microbiologist rubbished but later vindicated for warning that BSE could be transmitted to humans – obituary

Professor Richard Lacey, microbiologist rubbished but later vindicated for warning that BSE could be transmitted to humans – obituary

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Friday, June 29, 2018

Vaccines, TSE, Prion, risk factors?


European Medicines Agency 
Science Medicines Health

1 25 January 2018
2 EMA/CHMP/BWP/192228/2017
3 Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP)
4 Questions and answers on Bovine Spongiform
5 Encephalopathies (BSE) and vaccines
6 Draft agreed by BWP, VWP, SWP October 2017
Adopted by CHMP for release for consultation 25 January 2018
Start of public consultation 1 February 2018
End of consultation (deadline for comments) 31 July 2018
Agreed by BWP, VWP, SWP
Adopted by CHMP
Date of coming into effect
7
8 Comments should be provided using this template. The completed comments form should be sent
to Kaidi.koiv@ema.europa.eu
9 Keywords BSE safety, TSE, vaccines, vaccine manufacture, bovine materials, CJD, prions,
gelatin, bovine serum, milk derivatives, polysorbate, tallow.
10
11
Questions and answers on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE) and vaccines
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12 Questions and answers on Bovine Spongiform
13 Encephalopathies (BSE) and vaccines
14 Table of Contents
15 1. Introduction (background)...................................................................... 3
16 2. Scope....................................................................................................... 3
17 3. Summary................................................................................................. 3
18 4. Questions and answers on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and
19 variant CJD.................................................................................................. 4
20 5. Vaccines and risk of BSE transmission..................................................... 6
21 5.1. Questions and answers on bovine materials used in the manufacture of vaccines .........6
22 5.2. Questions and answers on vaccines and the measures taken to prevent the
23 transmission of BSE ....................................................................................................8
24 5.3. Questions and answers on the evidence that vaccines do not transmit BSE..................9
25

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26 1. Introduction (background)
27 Since recognition of BSE in the 1980’s, the use of bovine material in the manufacture of medicinal
28 products, including many vaccines, prompted action by European and National regulatory authorities to
29 assure the continued safety of the products. The appearance of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
30 (vCJD) and its association with BSE, underlined the importance of the measures taken and increased
31 concern regarding any potential risk associated with use of bovine material.

32 2. Scope

33 This is an update of the information in the Public Statement on the Evaluation of Bovine Spongiform
34 Encephalopathies (BSE) - risk via the use of materials of bovine origin in or during the manufacture of
vaccines1 35 and the Questions and Answers on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE) and
Vaccines2 36 . The public statement and Q&A were intended to provide an assessment of the risk due to
37 BSE of the use of bovine materials in vaccines when they were drafted in 2001. Since 2001,
38 understanding of the risks associated with BSE has progressed significantly and a routine review of
39 EMA guidelines identified this document as requiring updating. It includes information on the use of
40 bovine derived materials in vaccine manufacture. Risk assessment of other TSE-susceptible animal
41 species is covered in the Note for guidance on minimising the risk of transmitting animal spongiform
encephalopathy agents via human and veterinary medicinal products3 42 and the use of materials of
43 human origin is reviewed in the CHMP position statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasmaderived
and urine-derived medicinal products4 44 .

45 3. Summary

46 Any bovine-derived material used in the manufacture of a vaccine is regulated according to the
47 mandatory TSE guideline which has been continuously updated in the light of scientific knowledge.
48 The guideline dictates that a risk assessment is performed during development and authorisation of all
49 medicinal products. The risk assessment involves controlling the geographical source of the animals
50 used, the nature of the tissue used (risk of infectivity) and the method of production. Safe
51 geographical sourcing of animals is based on the latest Organisation Internationale des Epizooties
classification5 
52 of countries according to their BSE status. The safety of the tissue used for processing is
53 ensured by categorisation according to the WHO tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies6 
54 . Finally, production methods are assessed for their ability
55 to inactivate or remove the agent responsible for BSE. The CHMP and regulatory authorities within
1 Public Statement on the Evaluation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE)- risk via the use of materials of bovine origin in
or during the manufacture of vaccines
2 Questions and &Answers on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE) and Vaccines
3 Note for guidance on minimising the risk of transmitting animal spongiform encephalopathy agents via human and veterinary
medicinal products
and entered into force in 1992
4 CHMP position statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products
5 OIE List of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Risk Status of Member Countries
6 WHO Tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. Updated 2010.

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56 member states of the European Union undertake benefit/risk assessments before any vaccine is
57 authorised. The final benefit/risk decision includes the BSE risk assessment discussed above.
58 The CHMP and its experts historically conducted a review on the use of bovine material in the
59 manufacture of vaccines licensed within the EU to ensure that the sourcing of animals and of tissues
60 used up to that point in time was according to the TSE guideline. Subsequently, the assessment of all
61 new products includes an assessment of the BSE risk in line with the TSE guideline.
62 Based on the above measures being taken, the CHMP considers that the risk of BSE contamination of
63 vaccines used within the EU is extremely low. Nevertheless, in order to provide the highest level of
64 assurance, manufacturers have replaced materials of bovine origin, wherever possible.
65 There is no evidence to date that any vaccines have been contaminated with the agent which causes
66 BSE. Taking into consideration the measures already employed to ensure the safety of vaccines with
67 respect to BSE, the EMA concludes there is a very high level of assurance against the risk of BSE
68 contamination and therefore reiterates the benefits of vaccination. There is no evidence to relate
69 vaccines to the development of vCJD. Consequently, on the basis of current scientific evidence and of
70 measures being taken to avoid any possible contamination of vaccines with BSE, the EMA is of the
71 view that appropriate measures are in place to protect public health.
72 4. Questions and answers on Bovine Spongiform
73 Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant CJD

74 What is BSE?

75 BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) is a disease of cattle which is sometimes known as Mad Cow
76 disease. BSE belongs to a group of diseases called TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies).
77 BSE was recognised for the first time in 1986 in the UK. A similar disease in sheep, called scrapie, has
78 been recognised for over two centuries. Due to the eradication measures, this epidemic has declined
worldwide and as of 2017, there are only a few cases reported annually7 79 . In the UK, where the most
80 cases have been reported, the incidence of BSE has decreased from 37,280 in 1992 at the height of
81 the epidemic, to 0 cases in 2016.

82 All TSE diseases are associated with the appearance of tiny particles in brain and nerve cells. These
83 particles consist of an abnormal form of prion protein and are responsible for TSE diseases (see “What
84 are prions” below).

85 The most obvious symptoms of TSE diseases are in co-ordination of movements and mental
86 deterioration. Once a TSE disease becomes established, it becomes progressively more serious.
87 TSEs are said to be ‘transmissible’, because if certain tissues of an affected animal are given by
88 injection or by mouth to other animals, the disease may be passed on to them. Brain and spinal cord
89 are the tissues which are the highest risk in this respect.

90 How did the outbreak appear in animals?

91 The outbreak probably started as a result of feeding of animal derived meat-and-bone meal to cattle.
92 There is strong evidence and general agreement that the outbreak was then amplified by the
93 continued feeding of meat-and bone meal prepared from infected cattle.
94


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95
96 Does this kind of diseases occur in humans?

97 Yes, but these human diseases are very rare. They include classical (or sporadic) Creutzfeldt-Jakob
98 Disease (CJD/sCJD), variant CJD (vCJD), Kuru (transmission via cannibalism in Papua New Guinea)
99 and fatal familial insomnia. Classical CJD has been well studied for more than 70 years and occurs
100 sporadically worldwide at a rate of about 1 case per 1 million people and is not linked to BSE.
101 Can BSE be transmitted to humans?

102 In 1996, the first cases of a variant of Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD) were reported in the UK
103 (Lancet, 1996, 347: 921-925). There is strong scientific evidence indicating that vCJD and BSE are
104 caused by the same infectious prion agent and strong epidemiological and experimental scientific
105 evidence for the association between the ingestion of BSE contaminated food and vCJD. Experts
106 believe that certain types of meat (mechanically recovered meat which at that time contained high risk
107 tissues) or certain high risk tissues (brain) used in the preparation of industrial minced meat could
108 have played a major role in spreading the human form of TSE (vCJD).

109 Emergence of variant CJD (vCJD) was noted in the UK in 1996 and a total number of 178 definite or
probable cases have been reported so far in the UK8 110 . Although the number of cases has been in
111 decline in the UK since 2001, isolated cases of vCJD are still being identified in the UK as in other
112 countries.

113 Further information can be found in the CHMP position statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
114 plasma-derived and urine-derived medicinal products.

115 vCJD generally affects younger people (average age of onset: 28 years) than classical CJD and the
116 clinical symptoms are different.

117 What are prions?

118 Prions are proteins that are found in all animal species and in humans. Abnormal forms of prion protein
119 are found in TSEs such as BSE, scrapie and all forms of CJD. Abnormal forms of prion proteins are
120 closely associated with the spread of the disease. Unlike other infectious particles such as bacteria or
121 viruses, prions do not carry any genetic material. Prions are extremely difficult to destroy: they are
122 resistant to elevated temperatures and standard chemical conditions which would normally kill bacteria
123 and viruses.

124 How do prions cause BSE?

125 Spongiform encephalopathies (also known as prion diseases) are degenerative neurological disorders
126 characterised by the presence of massive amounts of modified (structurally abnormal) prion proteins.
127 For an unknown reason, the normal protein can be transformed into a different conformation, by
128 contact with a modified prion protein. This can happen mainly in the brain where a cascade of
129 progressive degeneration may start. It is thought that the ingestion of a critical amount of this
130 modified protein could trigger the disease.

131 There is no diagnostic test available yet to identify the disease prior to the start of clinical symptoms
132 and the development of a characteristic neurological pattern. However, for detecting BSE in
133 slaughtered animals, diagnostic tests are available and in use.


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134 No medicinal product is available to combat the disease, and no vaccine has been developed to protect
135 animals or people.
136 Why is the risk of BSE transmission being raised in relation to vaccines for human use?
137 Material of animal origin, including bovine derived materials, is used in the manufacture of some
138 vaccines.

139 However, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) has been advised by a panel of international experts
140 that the risk of BSE contamination of vaccines used in the EU is extremely low. There are no
141 indications that vCJD is linked to the use of vaccines, and it is felt that the risk posed by the use of
142 bovine material is very remote as substantiated by the experience to date.

143 5. Vaccines and risk of BSE transmission

144 5.1. Questions and answers on bovine materials used in the manufacture
145 of vaccines

146 What are vaccines and how do vaccines work?

147 Vaccines are medicinal products, which are given to protect individuals against viral or bacterial
148 infections. Some contain small amounts of inactivated viruses or bacteria, while others may contain
149 micro-organisms which, although alive, no longer cause disease (live attenuated vaccines). Vaccines
150 may also be composed of purified fractions of these micro-organisms or of components derived from
151 recombinant DNA technology. Vaccines act by stimulating the body’s own defences (the immune
152 system), so that when he or she comes in contact with the relevant virus or bacterium, he/she will be
153 protected against infection. Tetanus vaccine is an example of a bacterial vaccine and measles vaccine
154 is an example of a viral vaccine.

155 How are vaccines manufactured?

156 Vaccines are made by growing cultures of these viruses or bacteria, or cells which have undergone
157 recombinant manipulation, under controlled conditions. Some vaccines are then inactivated by
158 chemical treatment. Other vaccines are attenuated (live, but no longer able to cause the disease).
159 Bacteria require complex culture media for their growth. Viruses need to grow in cells and these cells
160 also require complex culture media. Recombinant cells can be either bacterial, insect or mammalian
161 and have similar complex nutritional needs. The culture media provide numerous nutritious elements
162 and growth factors, sometimes obtained from materials of animal origin, such as serum, milk and milk
163 derivatives, gelatin, meat extract or extracts from other muscular tissues (“peptones”).
164 After the processes of bacterial fermentation, viral growth in cell cultures or growth of recombinant
165 cells are completed, there is a purification process reducing these growth supplements to trace
166 amounts.

167 The bacterial or viral components of the vaccine are then diluted to the desired strength and prepared
168 into a finished product. Vaccines are presented in vials or pre-filled syringes containing the desired
169 bacterial, viral or recombinant components together with ingredients such as stabilisers. After
170 production, vaccines are given in defined doses which are proven to be safe and effective in clinical
171 trials.

172 Are any materials of bovine origin used in the manufacture of vaccines?

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173 Bovine derived materials are used at some stages in the manufacture of some, but not of all vaccines.
174 These bovine materials are one source of nutrients and growth factors for the growth of bacteria or for
175 the cells used to grow viruses. These elements are essentially provided from materials of animal origin.
176 Generally they are used only in the early stages of the manufacturing process of the vaccine
177 component(s), and then they are reduced to trace amounts during the further purification and dilution
178 steps.

179 In other cases, highly processed derivatives of a bovine material are used, e.g. as a stabiliser of the
180 finished product. For example polysorbates, (which are manufactured using very high temperature and
181 extreme chemical conditions which have been shown to inactivate prions) are used in a small number
182 of vaccines.

183 Manufacturers of vaccines strictly control the quality of the materials derived from animals by
184 obtaining them only from known, well controlled sources with systems in place to ensure the materials
185 do not pose a risk of contamination with BSE, and by only sourcing the materials from animals which
186 are fit for human consumption (see “How safe is the bovine material used in the manufacture of
187 vaccines?” below).

188 Is it possible to replace bovine materials used in the manufacture of vaccines with non189
animal materials?

190 Over the past years there have been many attempts to find a way to replace growth media containing
191 bovine derived materials by plant-derived or more synthetic media. This has often been successful.
192 However, not all attempts have succeeded in providing bacteria, viruses or cells with all the nutrients
193 present in the bovine material. In many cases, it has been possible to replace most or all of the animal
194 materials used during the production of vaccines. Researchers continue their efforts to eliminate
195 materials of animal origin in the manufacturing process.

196 Manufacturers were encouraged to re-establish their Working Seed/Cell Banks (WSB/WCB) if they
197 contained material where not all of the relevant information was available to demonstrate compliance
198 with the TSE Note for Guidance, even if there were no demonstrable TSE risks associated with their
199 use. The new WSB/WCB should be prepared using material for which all relevant information is
available9 200 . As a general precautionary measure, manufacturers of medicinal products are encouraged
201 not to use materials of bovine origin at all, if possible.

202 How safe is the bovine material used in the manufacture of vaccines?

203 Gelatin

204 Gelatin is extracted from different tissues (usually from skin and bone) from different animal species
205 (usually from cattle and pig). It is used directly in medicinal products, for example in capsules. Gelatin
206 is not made from a high risk material like brain or spinal cord, but it cannot be excluded that a small
207 amount of high risk material could be a contaminant in bones from which gelatin is extracted. BSE
infectivity has never been detected in bovine skin3 208 .
209 The production of gelatin from bones involves grinding, degreasing, heating followed by a hydrochloric
210 acid bath for several days. The gelatin may then be further treated with strong alkali or acid. In
211 addition there is a heat sterilisation step at a minimum of 133°C or 138°C. These processes have been
212 shown to have high capacity to reduce or eliminate any contaminating BSE prions.

 9 Re-establishment of Working Seeds and Working Cell Banks using TSE compliant materials EMEA/22314/02

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213
214
215 Bovine serum

216 Bovine serum is very rich in vitamins, growth factors and other components necessary to grow the
217 cells needed for viral vaccine production. The following measures are taken into account to ensure the
218 safety of serum regarding the risk of transmission of contamination with BSE:
219 - Bovine serum is obtained only from countries with a negligible or controlled BSE risk
220 - Bovine serum is obtained only from animals which are fit for human consumption.
221 - Each batch of serum or plasma is traceable to the slaughterhouse to ensure that material
222 of unknown quality/TSE risk does not enter the supply chain. Methods of animal stunning
223 and slaughter are controlled to reduce/avoid the risk of cross-contamination of blood with high
224 risk tissues such as brain.

225 - The maximum age of cattle at slaughter is strictly limited
226 - The presence of the BSE prion has not been conclusively detected in the blood of cattle which
are sick or incubating the disease3 227 .

228 Milk and milk derivatives (for example lactose)

229 - Bovine milk has always been considered as non-infectious, regardless of the country of origin.
230 Within the limits of experimental testing, BSE prion has not been detected in the milk of cattle
which are sick or incubating the disease9 231 .

232 - Lactose is a natural sugar present in milk. Milk used for lactose production must be collected
233 under the same conditions as milk for human consumption. This ensures that milk comes from
234 healthy animals, controlled by veterinary welfare systems.

235 Meat extracts

236 Meat extracts are mainly derived from muscular tissues. All of the tissues from which meat extracts
are derived are classified in the no or low risk categories by the WHO3 237 and high risk material is
238 excluded. This material is collected from countries with a negligible or controlled BSE risk. Taking these
239 criteria into consideration, meat extracts do not represent a risk of BSE transmission.
240 Polysorbate (Tallow derivatives)

241 Tallow derivatives are prepared from tallow (fat) which is derived from animal fat tissue. The tallow
242 starting material is prepared by separating it from the protein fraction. It has been shown that BSE
243 infectivity (experimentally added to the animal fat tissue) is never found in the tallow fraction, but can
244 be found in the protein fraction (which is not used in the manufacture of tallow derivatives). Tallow
245 derivatives are made from tallow starting material by very high temperature and extreme chemical
246 treatment. Tallow derivatives are extremely unlikely to pose any risk of transmitting BSE. Examples of
247 tallow derivatives are stearates (used in many tablets) and polysorbate (occasionally used to stabilise
248 vaccines). In most cases, animal-derived polysorbate has been replaced by plant-derived polysorbate.

249 5.2. Questions and answers on vaccines and the measures taken to
250 prevent the transmission of BSE

251 What measures are applied to vaccines to prevent BSE infection?

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252 All medicinal products, including vaccines, have been thoroughly evaluated before they are authorised
253 to be marketed. To receive this authorisation to market their product, a pharmaceutical company has
254 to describe in detail (in a dossier) the results of all the studies demonstrating the quality, safety and
255 efficacy of the medicinal product. The dossier also documents the method of production and control of
256 each component of the medicinal product and all factors concerning the risk of BSE transmission are
257 presented. The dossier is evaluated by the relevant National Authorities or the EMA, taking into
258 account all existing guidelines and legal texts. It is only when a dossier is complete and fully
259 satisfactory that a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product is granted.

260 For all bovine materials used in the manufacture of vaccines (and all other medicinal products) an
261 assessment is made of the risk of BSE contamination. This is carried out in accordance to the European
262 Note for guidance on minimising the risk of transmitting animal spongiform encephalopathy agents via
263 human and veterinary medicinal products. This legally mandatory guideline was first applied in 1991,
264 and has been regularly updated since. Factors taken into special account are:

265 - The country of origin of the animals used,

266 - The nature of the tissue used (for example, brain is considered the highest risk, serum and
267 muscle tissue are of the lowest risk),

268 - Information on traceability (origin and follow-up of herds, type of feed, etc.),

269 - Whether the manufacturing processes of both the materials of bovine origin and the vaccine
270 could reduce or destroy any BSE, if it were to be present.

271 Therefore, safety related to the risk of transmitting BSE is assessed by taking into account not only the
272 geographical origin of animals but also their feeding, their age at slaughter, technique of slaughter and
273 carving, nature of tissues used, as well as manufacturing processes which must comply with European
274 guidelines, directives and recommendations. It is the assessment of all these criteria, which ensures
275 the freedom of a medicinal product from contamination with the agent that causes BSE before it is
276 authorised and marketed.

277 In June 2000, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) conducted a review of the safety of all vaccines
278 (including those which were licensed prior to the introduction of the Note for guidance on minimising
279 the risk of transmitting animal spongiform encephalopathy agents via human and veterinary medicinal
280 products) on the EU market with respect to BSE contamination and concluded that all vaccines are
281 indeed safe. Therefore, all vaccines authorised to date, have been reviewed for safety with respect to
282 BSE, against the above criteria.

283 5.3. Questions and answers on the evidence that vaccines do not transmit
284 BSE.

285 What evidence is there that vaccines were not the cause of the vCJD cases in the UK?

286 The majority of vCJD cases occurred in the UK between 1996 and 2005. The same vaccines that were
287 given to these people in the UK in their early life were also used in other countries at the same time.
288 No vCJD cases occurred in these other countries despite administration of identical vaccines, from the
289 same manufacturers and using identical materials.

290 Furthermore, most vCJD patients from the height of the epidemic were vaccinated prior to the
291 occurrence of BSE in British herds (most vaccines are given in the first two years of life). Thus, the
292 vaccines used to immunise children who developed vCJD in later life had been produced in the years 

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293 before the BSE epidemic and so the agent that causes BSE could not have been present in the doses of
294 vaccine given to these children.

295 What is the experts’ opinion on the safety of vaccines with respect to BSE?

296 Vaccines have played, and continue to play, a crucial role in the prevention and eradication of viral
297 infectious diseases, such as measles, mumps, rubella, polio and smallpox, and of bacterial infectious
298 diseases such as diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis. Vaccines currently in use have an excellent safety
299 record. A reduction in use of vaccines is likely to result in the spread of damaging or fatal diseases.
300 In 2001, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) was advised by a panel of international experts that
301 the risk of BSE contamination of vaccines used in the EU is vanishingly small. To date there are no
302 indications that vCJD is linked to the use of any vaccines, and that the risk posed by the use of bovine
303 materials is very remote as substantiated by the experience to date.

304 To date, there are no indications that vCJD is linked to the use of any vaccines, and that the risk posed
305 by the use of bovine materials is very remote as substantiated by the experience to date.



 i think i should take this time to make perfectly clear to _everyone_, this board i set up for me to pass information on transmissible spongiform encephalopathy tse prion disease of human and animals, and the latest science there from that i can possibly get my hands on, and not have to argue with anyone, so the information would be there for future use for everyone. this tse prion page is not, NOT, an anti-vaccine forum. now i have written in the past, and i might in the future of risk factors there from on the issues of vaccines, where and if that might come up about tse prion issues. in the early days there was much written on that topic, and i addressed that issue in great detail during and after the BSE Inquiry. but vaccines have saved and continue to save countless lives across the globe, and like i said, i get my flu vaccine every year. i will not even debate the issue of anti vaccine here, it's simply not up for debate.

with that said, i will run this by for everyone, share this one time past history of the tse prion vaccine issue for those that may need references. this reply will be long with references for your future use...

we will start way back before the BSE Inquiry was published online, i was following via Her Majesty's Air Mail and getting daily updates, and sending them to Dr. Priongle. ...LOL Dr. Tom Pringle, had the best damn page on tse prion disease ever. also, i made a submission to BSE Inquiry (they ask) about nutritional supplements that contained SRM. i think about here;

year 2000


then years later, the BSE Inquiry was published online, then taken off, then archived, then those urls changed, then some new ones listed, and so on and so forth. but a decade or so later, i decided to put it all on the WWW here for future references;


at some point, i became concerned with vaccines, when i became aware of the iatrogenic threats, and that the inoculation mode route of transmission, would be one of the most efficient way to transmit disease, more so than oral consumption. i become very concerned with live vaccines, there were not many that i could find, but there was one that i was very concerned about, if my mind don't fail me now, it was a live rabies vaccine, and only used mainly in at the time, third world countries, but this is where my concern came about was the fact it was a live vaccine, made from sheep brains, and i had gotten my hands on an on several reports of an outbreaks of scrapie in flocks that had used a vaccine made up from sheep brains. one was the Louping-vaccine for sheep, a great many of these sheep went down with Scrapie after using this Louping-ill vaccine made up from sheep brains. funny thing, my old friend and scientist, the late Dr. Joe C. Gibbs and someone from England, both sent me that old study, and Dr. Gibbs told me then, about one of my rants about the ever elusive spontaneous sporadic cjd, that just comes from nothing, 85%+ of all cases, a happen stance of bad luck, well, i will not say what he told me, but he did not think sporadic cjd was so spontaneous as other folks seem to think it is...

Subject: Louping-ill vaccine documents from November 23rd, 1946 Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 17:44:57 -0700 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

THE VETERINARY RECORD 516 No 47. Vol. 58 November 23rd, 1946

NATIONAL VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1946

The annual Congress, 1946, was held at the Royal Veterinary College, Royal College Street, London, N.W.I. from September 22nd to September 27th.

Opening Meeting

[skip to scrapie vaccine issue...tss]

Papers Presented to Congress

The papers presented to this year's Congress had as their general theme the progressive work of the profession during the war years. Their appeal was clearly demonstrated by the large and remarkably uniform attendance in the Grand Hall of the Royal Veterinary College throughout the series; between 200 and 250 members were present and they showed a keen interest in every paper, which was reflected in the expression of some disappointment that the time available for discussion did not permit of the participation of more than a small proportion of would-be contributors.

In this issue we publish (below) the first to be read and discussed, that by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E., "Advances in Veterinary Research." Next week's issue will contain the paper on "Some Recent Advances in Veterinary Medicine and Surgery in Large-Animal Practice" by Mr. T. Norman Gold, M.R.C.V.S. In succeeding numbers of the Record will be reproduced, also with reports of discussions, that by Mr. W. L. Weipers, M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., on the same subject as relating to small-animal practice, and the papers by Mr. J. N. Ritchie, B.SC., M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., and Mr. H.W. Steele-Bodger, M.R.C.V.S., on "War-time Achievements of the British Home Veterinary Services."

The first scientific paper of Congress was read by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E. on Monday, September 23rd, 1946, when Professor J. Basil Buxton, M.A., F.R.C.V.S, D.V.H., Prinicipal of the Royal Veterinary College, presided.

Advances in Veterinary Research

by

W.S. GORDON, PH.D., M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E.

Agriculteral Research Council, Field Station, Compton, Berks.

Louping-ill, Tick-borne Fever and Scrapie

In 1930 Pool, Browniee & Wilson recorded that louping-ill was a transmissible disease. Greig et al, (1931) showed that the infective agent was a filter-passing virus with neurotropic characters and Browniee & Wilson (1932) that the essential pathology was that of an encephalomyelitis. Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod (1932) and MacLeod & Gordon (1932) confirmed and extended this work. It was shown that on louping-ill farms the virus was present in the blood of many sheep which did not show clinical symptoms indicating involvement of the central nervous system and that for the perpetuation and spread of the disease these subclinical cases were probably of greater importance that the frank clinical cases because, in Nature, the disease was spread by the tick, lxodes ricinus L. More recently Wilson (1945, 1946) has described the cultivation of the virus in a chick embryo medium, the pathogenic properties of this culture virus and the preparation of louping-ill antiserum.

Between 1931 and 1934 I carried out experiments which resulted in the development of an effective vaccine for the prevention of louping-ill.* This vaccine has been in general use since 1935 and in his annual report to the Animal Diseases Research Association this year, Dr. Greig stated that about 227,000 doses of vaccine had been issued from Moredun alone.

Dr. Gordon illustrated this portion of his paper by means of graphs and diagrams projected by the epidiascope.

This investigation, however, did not begin and end with the study of louping-ill; it had, by good fortune, a more romantic turn and less fortunately a final dramtic twist which led almost to catastrope. After it had been established that a solid immunity to louping-ill could be induced in sheep, a group of immunized and a group of susceptible animals were placed together on the tick-infected pasture of a louping-ill farm. Each day all the animals were gathered and their temperatures were recorded. It was anticipated that febrile reactions with some fatalities would develop in the controls while the louping-ill immunes would remain normal. Contrary to expectation, however, every sheep, both immune and control, developed a febrile reaction. This unexpected result made neccessary further investigation which showed that the febrile reaction in the louping-ill immunes was due to a hitherto undescribed infective agent, a Rickettsia-like organism which could be observed in the cytoplasm of the grannular leucocytes, especially the neutrophil polymorphs (MacLeod (1932), Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod. MacLeod & Gordon (1933). MacLeod (1936). MacLeod collected ticks over many widely separated parts of Scotland and all were found to harbour the infective agent of tick-borne fever, and it is probable that all sheep on tick-infested farms develop this disease, at least on the first occasion that they become infested with ticks. When the infection is passed in series through susceptible adult sheep it causes a sever, febrile reaction, dullness and loss of bodily condition but it rarely, if ever, proves fatal. It is clear, however, that it aggravates the harmful effects of a louping-ill infection and it is a serious additional complication to such infections as pyaemia and the anacrobic infections which beset lambs on the hill farms of Northern Britain.

Studying the epidemiology of louping-ill on hill farms it became obvious that the pyaemic condition of lambs described by M'Fadyean (1894) was very prevalent on tick infested farms Pyaemia is a crippling condition of lambs associated with tick-bite and is often confused with louping-ill. It is caused by infection with Staphylococcus aureus and affected animals may show abscess formation on the skin, in the joints, viscera, meninges and elsewhere in the body. It was thought that tick-borne fever might have ben a predisposing factor in this disease and unsuccessful attempts were made by Taylor, Holman & Gordon (1941) to reproduce the condition by infecting lambs subcutaneously with the staphylococcus and concurrently produceing infections with tickborne fever and louping-ill in the same lambs. Work on pyaemia was then continued by McDiarmid (1946a, 1946b, 1946c), who succeeded in reproducing a pyaemic disease in mice, guinea-pigs and lambs similar to the naturally occuring condition by intravenous inoculation of Staphylococcus aureus. He also found a bacteraemic form of the disease in which no gross pyaemic lesions were observed. The prevention or treatment of this condition presents a formidable problem. It is unlikely that staphylococcal ???oid will provide an effective immunity and even if penicillin proved to be a successful treatment, the difficulty of applying it in adequate and sustained dosage to young lambs on hill farms would be almost insurmountable.

>From 1931 to 1934 field trials to test the immunizing value and harmlessness of the loup-ill vaccine were carried out on a gradually increasing scale. Many thousands of sheep were vaccinated and similar numbers, living under identical conditions were left as controls. The end result showed that an average mortability of about 9 percent in the controls was reduced to less than 1 percent in the vaccinated animals. While the efficiency of the vaccine was obvious after the second year of work, previous bitter experience had shown the wisdom of withholding a biological product from widespread use until it had been successfully produced in bulk, as opposed to small-scale experimental production and until it had been thoroughly tested for immunizing efficiency and freedom from harmful effects. It was thought that after four years testing this stage had been reached in 1935, and in the spring of that year the vaccine was issued for general use. It comprised a 10 percent saline suspension of brain, spinal cord and spleen tissues taken from sheep five days after infection with louping-ill virus by intracerebral inoculation. To this suspension 0-35 percent of formalin was added to inactivate the virus and its safety for use as a vaccine was checked by intracerbral inoculation of mice and sheep and by the inoculation of culture medium. Its protective power was proved by vaccination sheep and later subjecting them, along with controls, to a test dose of living virus.

Vaccine for issue had to be free from detectable, living virus and capable of protecting sheep against a test dose of virus applied subcutaneously. The 1935 vaccine conformed to these standards and was issued for inoculation in March as three separate batches labelled 1, 2, and 3. The tissues of 140 sheep were employed to make batch 1 of which 22,270 doses were used; 114 to make batch 2 of which 18,000 doses were used and 44 to make batch 3 of which 4,360 doses were used. All the sheep tissues incorporated in the vaccine were obtained from yearling sheep. During 1935 and 1936 the vaccine proved highly efficient in the prevention of loup-ill and no user observed an ill-effect in the inoculated animals. In September, 1937, two and a half years after vaccinating the sheep, two owners complained that scrapie, a disease which had not before been observed in the Blackface breed, was appearing in their stock of Blackface sheep and further that it was confined to animals vaccinated with louping-ill vaccine in 1935. At that stage it was difficult to conceive that the occurrence could be associated with the injection of the vaccine but in view of the implications, I visited most of the farms on which sheep had been vaccinated in 1935. It was at this point that the investigation reached its dramatic phase; I shall not forget the profound effect on my emotions when I visited these farms and was warmly welcomed because of the great benefits resulting from the application of louping-ill vaccine, wheras the chief purpose of my visit was to determine if scrapie was appearing in the inoculated sheep. The enquiry made the position clear. Scrapie was developing in the sheep vaccinated in 1935 and it was only in a few instances that the owner was associating the occurrence with louping-ill vaccination. The disease was affecting all breeds and it was confined to the animals vaccinated with batch 2. This was clearly demonstrated on a number of farms on which batch 1 had been used to inoculate the hoggs in 1935 and batch 2 to inoculate the ewes. None of the hoggs, which at this time were three- year-old ewes. At this time it was difficult to forecast whether all of the 18,000 sheep which had received batch 2 vaccine would develop scrapie. It was fortunate, however, that the majority of the sheep vaccinated with batch 2 were ewes and therfore all that were four years old and upwards at the time of vaccination had already been disposed of and there only remained the ewes which had been two to three years old at the time of vaccination, consequently no accurate assessment of the incidence of scrapie could be made. On a few farms, however, where vaccination was confined to hoggs, the incidence ranged from 1 percent, to 35 percent, with an average of about 5 percent. Since batch 2 vaccine had been incriminated as a probable source of scrapie infection, an attempt was made to trace the origin of the 112 sheep whose tissues had been included in the vaccine. It was found that they had been supplied by three owners and that all were of the Blackface or Greyface breed with the exception of eight which were Cheviot lambs born in 1935 from ewes which had been in contact with scrapie infection. Some of these contact ewes developed scrapie in 1936-37 and three surviving fellow lambs to the eight included in the batch 2 vaccine of 1935 developed scrapie, one in September, 1936, one in February, 1937, and one in November, 1937. There was, therefore, strong presumptive evidence that the eight Cheviot lambs included in the vaccine althought apparently healthy were, in fact, in the incubative stage of a scrapie infection and that in their tissues there was an infective agent which had contaminated the batch 2 vaccine, rendering it liable to set up scrapie. If that assumption was correct then the evidence indicated that:-

(1) the infective agent of scrapie was present in the brain, spinal cord and or spleen of infected sheep:

(2) it could withstand a concentration of formalin of 0-35 percent, which inactivated the virus of louping-ill:

(3) it could be transmitted by subcutaneous inoculation;

(4) it had an incubative period of two years and longer.

Two Frenchmen, Cuille & Chelle (1939) as the result of experiments commenced in 1932, reported the successful infection of sheep by inoculation of emulsions of spinal cord or brain material by the intracerebral, epidural, intraocular and subcutaneous routes The incubation period varied according to the route employed, being one year intracerebrally, 15 months intraocularly and 20 months subcutaneously. They failed to infect rabbits but succeeded in infecting goats. Another important part of their work showed that the infective agent could pass throught a chamberland 1.3 filter, thus demonstrating that the infective agent was a filtrable virus. It was a curious coincidence that while they were doing their transmission experiments their work was being confirmed by the unforeseeable infectivity of a formalinized tissue vaccine.

As a result of this experience a large-scale transmision experiment involving the ue of 788 sheep was commenced in 1938 on a farm specially taken for the purpose by the Animal Diseases Research Association with funds provided by the Agricultural Research Council. The experiment was designed to determine the nature of the infective agent and the pathogenesis of the disease. It is only possible here to give a summary of the result which showed that (1) saline suspensions of brain and spinal cord tissue of sheep affected with scrapie were infective to normal sheep when inoculatted intracerebrally or subcutaneously; (2) the incubation period after intracerebral inoculation was seven months and upwards and only 60 percent of the inoculated sheep developed scrapie during a period of four and a half years; (3) the incubation period after subcutaneous inoculation was 15 months and upwards and only about 30 percent of the inoculated sheep developed the disease during the four and a half years: (4) the infective agent was of small size and probably a filtrable virus.

The prolonged incubative period of the disease and the remarkable resistance of the causal agent to formalin are features of distinct interest. It still remains to determine if a biological test can be devised to detect infected animals so that they can be killed for food before they develop clinical symptoms and to explore the possibilities of producing an immunity to the disease.

==================================================================

Greetings List Members,

pretty disturbing document. now, what would stop this from happening with the vaccineCJD in children???

kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

==========

year 2018

NOW, my greatest fear is iatrogenic tse prion transmission, through many various routes and sources, and now back to vaccines and pigs from CWD TSE Prion...

first, reality;

1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8 

Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during neurosurgery. 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC. 

Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of 

Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, 

Bethesda, MD 20892. 

Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them. 

PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE] 


now

***> CWD TO PIGS <***

Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES

Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease

Author item Moore, Sarah item Kunkle, Robert item Kondru, Naveen item Manne, Sireesha item Smith, Jodi item Kanthasamy, Anumantha item West Greenlee, M item Greenlee, Justin

Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 3/15/2017 Publication Date: N/A Citation: N/A Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally-occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. We previously demonstrated that disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) can be detected in the brain and retina from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent. In that study, neurological signs consistent with prion disease were observed only in one pig: an intracranially challenged pig that was euthanized at 64 months post-challenge. The purpose of this study was to use an antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA) and real-time quaking-induced conversion (QuIC) to determine whether PrPSc is present in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the CWD agent.

Methods: At two months of age, crossbred pigs were challenged by the intracranial route (n=20), oral route (n=19), or were left unchallenged (n=9). At approximately 6 months of age, the time at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (<6 challenge="" groups="" month="" pigs="" remaining="" the="">6 month challenge groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post challenge (mpc). The retropharyngeal lymph node (RPLN) was screened for the presence of PrPSc by EIA and immunohistochemistry (IHC). The RPLN, palatine tonsil, and mesenteric lymph node (MLN) from 6-7 pigs per challenge group were also tested using EIA and QuIC.

Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). Conclusions:

This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge.

CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.

Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.

Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....


snip...see much more here ;

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 05, 2017

Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 05, 2017

*** Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease ***


i remember asking this fateful question back in ...i think it was 2001...yes, the infamous 50 STATE BSE EMERGENCY CONFERENCE CALL, and i ask just that question, they could not answer it 17 years ago, and they can't answer it today i don't think...

2017 Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000, Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Subject: MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017


MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017


FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory 


11998 DET-DO MI 48846-847 OPR 4/4/2017 OAI 


http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/bseinspections.csv 


NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED


OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED


VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED


RTS = REFERRED TO STATE


OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions...end...TSS


V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD 

FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000. 

Deer and elk not considered at high risk include: 

(1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and 

(2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.




Friday, December 14, 2012

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

snip...

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

snip...

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).

The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

snip...

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

snip...

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

snip...

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

snip...

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

snip...



TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***



TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2017 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION



THIS April, 4, 2017 violation of the mad cow 21 CFR 589.2000 OAI is very serious for the great state of Michigan, some 20 years post FDA mad cow feed of August 1997. if would most likely take a FOIA request and a decade of wrangling to find out more. 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2017

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION 

I would kindly like to comment on this FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)4 format, for reporting these breaches of BSE TSE prion protocols, from the extensive mad cow feed ban warning letters the fda use to put out for each violations. simply put, this excel format sucks, and the FDA et al intentionally made it this difficult to follow the usda fda mad cow follies. this is an intentional format to make it as difficult as possible to follow these breaches of the mad cow TSE prion safety feed protocols. to have absolutely no chronological or numerical order, and to format such violations in a way that they are almost impossible to find, says a lot about just how far the FDA and our fine federal friends will go through to hide these continued violations of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, and any breaches of protocols there from. once again, the wolf guarding the henhouse $$$

NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED

OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED

VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED

RTS = REFERRED TO STATE

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions. 

2016


ONE more thing, please remember, the label does not have to say ''deer ration'' for cervid to be pumped up with. you can get the same ''high protein'' from many sources of high protein feed for animals other than cattle, and feed them to cervid...

Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009


Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009



ONE DECADE POST MAD COW FEED BAN OF AUGUST 1997...2007

2007
10,000,000 POUNDS REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush,
WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

PAGE NOT FOUND

ALABAMA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________ 

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

CODE

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

27,694,240 lbs

DISTRIBUTION

MI 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

CODE

None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

?????

DISTRIBUTION

KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


=====

PRODUCT 

Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

CODE

No code or lot number.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Mars Petcare US, Clinton, OK, by telephone on May 21, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Product may have contained prohibited materials without cautionary statement on the label.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

208,820 pounds

DISTRIBUTION

TX

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 26, 2009

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST 

PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 

CODE None 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

DISTRIBUTION KY 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

### 


MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II 

______________________________ 


PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 

CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons 

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###



U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de


######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########


Greetings List Members,

I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference call today and even managed to ask a question. that is when the trouble started.

I submitted a version of my notes to Sandra Blakeslee of the New York Times, whom seemed very upset, and rightly so.

"They tell me it is a closed meeting and they will release whatever information they deem fit. Rather infuriating."

and i would have been doing just fine, until i asked my question. i was surprised my time to ask a question so quick.

(understand, these are taken from my notes for now. the spelling of names and such could be off.)

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking] NO

from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again;

[unknown woman] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me from this conference now?

at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the conference.

IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my notes, BUT PLEASE do not depend on them. ask for transcript from;

RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV 301-827-6906

he would be glad to give you one ;-)

Rockville Maryland, Richard Barns Host

BSE issues in the U.S., How they were labelling ruminant feed? Revising issues.

The conference opened up with the explaining of the U.K. BSE epidemic winding down with about 30 cases a week.

although new cases in other countries were now appearing.

Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE.

BSE increasing across Europe.

Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product, heightened interest in U.S.

A recent statement in Washington Post, said the New Administration (old GW) has a list of issues. BSE is one of the issues.

BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater interest in MBM not to enter U.S.

HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S. it would be economically disastrous to the render, feed, cattle, industries, and for human health.

(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now jot down some figures in which they told you, 'no need to write them down'. just hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope i don't ???)

80% inspection of rendering

*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT occurred.

sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION, have not been reinspected (70% to 80%).

Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K. and other European Firms.

Gloria Dunason Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance. This _did not_ occur. Mixed level of compliance, depending on firm.

Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license

system in place for home rendering & feed 76% in compliance 79% cross contamination 21% DID NOT have system 92% record keeping less than 60% total compliance

279 inspectors 185 handling prohibited materials

Renderer at top of pyramid, significant part of compliance. 84% compliance

failed to have caution statement render 72% compliance & cross contamination caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE'

56 FIRMS NEVER INSPECTED

1240 FDA license feed mills 846 inspected

"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected"

80% compliance for feed.

10% don't have system.

NON-FDA licensed mills There is NO inventory on non licensed mills. approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ??? 4,344 ever inspected. "FDA does not have a lot of experience with"

40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'.

74% Commingling compliance

"This industry needs a lot of work and only half gotten to"

"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be re-inspected, in addition to the 8,000 Firms."

Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end of January or 30 days, and other states 60 days. to change feed status??? Contract check and ask questions and pass info.

At this time, we will take questions.

[I was about the third or fourth to ask question. then all B.S.eee broke loose, and i lost my train of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]

someone asking about nutritional supplements and sourcing, did not get name. something about inspectors not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference person assuring that Steve Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were handling that.

Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions that did not know what to do???

[Dennis Wilson] California Food Agr. Imports, are they looking at imports?

[Conference person] they are looking at imports, FDA issued imports Bulletin.

[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in question, not related i don't think] Why do we have non-licensed facilities?

(conference person) other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???

Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson licensed 400 non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of 6000 to 8000,

(they really don't know how many non licensed Firms in U.S. they guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS)

Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not'

Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr. Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years. concerned of Firms that have changed owners.

THE END

TSS

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############



FROM New York TIMES


Subject: Re: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:02:47 -0700

From: "Sandy Blakeslee"

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: 1


Hi terry -- thanks for all your help. I know it made a difference with the FDA getting out that release.


----- Original Message -----

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 2:06 PM

Subject: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

hi sandy,

From the New York Times NYTimes.com, January 11, 2001

Many Makers of Feed Fail to Heed Rules on Mad Cow Disease By SANDRA BLAKESLEE

see full history here of the infamous United States 50 state emergency conference call on mad cow disease...

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html


O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 


***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 


PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,

Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a

"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France

Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.

To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.

These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.

Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 


why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

snip...

R. BRADLEY


Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 



MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017

Rethinking Major grain organizations opposition to CFIA's control zone approach to Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion Mad Deer Type Disease 2017?


WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017

*** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka Mad Deer Disease and the Real Estate Market Land Values ***


ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION 

10. ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION AKA MAD DEER ELK DISEASE IN HUMANS, has it already happened, that should be the question... 

''In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II)

EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) Antonia Ricci Ana Allende Declan Bolton Marianne Chemaly Robert Davies Pablo Salvador Fernández Escámez ... See all authors 

First published: 17 January 2018 https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5132 ;

also, see; 

8. Even though human TSE‐exposure risk through consumption of game from European cervids can be assumed to be minor, if at all existing, no final conclusion can be drawn due to the overall lack of scientific data. In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids. It might be prudent considering appropriate measures to reduce such a risk, e.g. excluding tissues such as CNS and lymphoid tissues from the human food chain, which would greatly reduce any potential risk for consumers. However, it is stressed that currently, no data regarding a risk of TSE infections from cervid products are available. 

snip... 

The tissue distribution of infectivity in CWD‐infected cervids is now known to extend beyond CNS and lymphoid tissues. While the removal of these specific tissues from the food chain would reduce human dietary exposure to infectivity, exclusion from the food chain of the whole carcass of any infected animal would be required to eliminate human dietary exposure. 


zoonosis zoonotic cervid tse prion cwd to humans, preparing for the storm 

***An alternative to modeling the species barrier is the cell-free conversion assay which points to CWD as the animal prion disease with the greatest zoonotic potential, after (and very much less than) BSE.116*** 


To date there is no direct evidence that CWD has been or can be transmitted from animals to humans. 

However, initial findings from a laboratory research project funded by the Alberta Prion Research Institute (APRI) and Alberta Livestock Meat Agency (ALMA), and led by a Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) scientist indicate that CWD has been transmitted to cynomolgus macaques (the non-human primate species most closely related to humans that may be used in research), through both the intracranial and oral routes of exposure. 

Both infected brain and muscle tissues were found to transmit disease. 

Health Canada’s Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) was asked to consider the impact of these findings on the Branch’s current position on CWD in health products and foods. 

Summary and Recommendation: 

snip...

Health Portfolio partners were recently made aware of initial findings from a research project led by a CFIA scientist that have demonstrated that cynomolgus macaques can be infected via intracranial exposure and oral gavage with CWD infected muscle. 

These findings suggest that CWD, under specific experimental conditions, has the potential to cross the human species barrier, including by enteral feeding of CWD infected muscle. 


*** WDA 2016 NEW YORK *** 

We found that CWD adapts to a new host more readily than BSE and that human PrP was unexpectedly prone to misfolding by CWD prions. 

In addition, we investigated the role of specific regions of the bovine, deer and human PrP protein in resistance to conversion by prions from another species. 

***We have concluded that the human protein has a region that confers unusual susceptibility to conversion by CWD prions. 

Student Presentations Session 2 

The species barriers and public health threat of CWD and BSE prions 

Ms. Kristen Davenport1, Dr. Davin Henderson1, Dr. Candace Mathiason1, Dr. Edward Hoover1 1Colorado State University 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is spreading rapidly through cervid populations in the USA. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, mad cow disease) arose in the 1980s because cattle were fed recycled animal protein. 

These and other prion diseases are caused by abnormal folding of the normal prion protein (PrP) into a disease causing form (PrPd), which is pathogenic to nervous system cells and can cause subsequent PrP to misfold. CWD spreads among cervids very efficiently, but it has not yet infected humans. On the other hand, BSE was spread only when cattle consumed infected bovine or ovine tissue, but did infect humans and other species. 

The objective of this research is to understand the role of PrP structure in cross-species infection by CWD and BSE. To study the propensity of each species’ PrP to be induced to misfold by the presence of PrPd from verious species, we have used an in vitro system that permits detection of PrPd in real-time. 

We measured the conversion efficiency of various combinations of PrPd seeds and PrP substrate combinations. 

We observed the cross-species behavior of CWD and BSE, in addition to feline-adapted CWD and BSE. We found that CWD adapts to a new host more readily than BSE and that human PrP was unexpectedly prone to misfolding by CWD prions. In addition, we investigated the role of specific regions of the bovine, deer and human PrP protein in resistance to conversion by prions from another species. 

***We have concluded that the human protein has a region that confers unusual susceptibility to conversion by CWD prions. CWD is unique among prion diseases in its rapid spread in natural populations. BSE prions are essentially unaltered upon passage to a new species, while CWD adapts to the new species. This adaptation has consequences for surveillance of humans exposed to CWD. Wildlife Disease Risk Communication Research Contributes to Wildlife Trust Administration Exploring perceptions about chronic wasting disease risks among wildlife and agriculture professionals and stakeholders


CDC CWD 2018 TRANSMISSION


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

Spongiform Encephalopathy in Captive Wild ZOO BSE INQUIRY


BSE INQUIRY

CJD9/10022

October 1994

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane 

BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.


*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***

*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***

*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***

There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).

The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker (p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included, this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).

snip...

It was found that when veal was included in the model with another exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).

snip...

In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD. When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS STATISTICALLY. ...

snip...

In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3 studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)

snip...see full report ;


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2017 

CDC Now Recommends Strongly consider having the deer or elk tested for CWD before you eat the meat 


SATURDAY, JANUARY 27, 2018 

CDC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE REPORT USA JANUARY 2018


Subject: CDC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE REPORT USA JANUARY 2018

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION IS THE USA AND NORTH AMERICA'S MAD COW DISEASE. 

THE USDA INC ET AL WORKED VERY HARD CONCEALING BSE TSE PRION IN CATTLE. they almost succeeded $$$

BUT CWD TSE PRION IN CERVIDS IS A DIFFERENT BEAST, THE COVER UP THERE, USDA INC COULD NOT CONTAIN.

SPORADIC CJD IS 85%+ OF ALL HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE.

SPORADIC CJD HAS NOW BEEN LINKED TO TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL BSE, SCRAPIE, AND CWD.

SPORADIC/SPONTANEOUS TSE HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN.

***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***


CDC CWD TSE PRION UPDATE USA JANUARY 2018

As of January 2018, CWD in free-ranging deer, elk and/or moose has been reported in at least 22 states in the continental United States, as well as two provinces in Canada. In addition, CWD has been reported in reindeer and moose in Norway, and a small number of imported cases have been reported in South Korea. The disease has also been found in farmed deer and elk. CWD was first identified in captive deer in the late 1960s in Colorado and in wild deer in 1981. By the 1990s, it had been reported in surrounding areas in northern Colorado and southern Wyoming. Since 2000, the area known to be affected by CWD in free-ranging animals has increased to at least 22 states, including states in the Midwest, Southwest, and limited areas on the East Coast.. It is possible that CWD may also occur in other states without strong animal surveillance systems, but that cases haven’t been detected yet. Once CWD is established in an area, the risk can remain for a long time in the environment. The affected areas are likely to continue to expand. Nationwide, the overall occurrence of CWD in free-ranging deer and elk is relatively low. However, in several locations where the disease is established, infection rates may exceed 10 percent (1 in 10), and localized infection rates of more than 25 percent (1 in 4) have been reported. The infection rates among some captive deer can be much higher, with a rate of 79% (nearly 4 in 5) reported from at least one captive herd. As of January 2018, there were 186 counties in 22 states with reported CWD in free-ranging cervids. 

Chronic Wasting Disease Among Free-Ranging Cervids by County, United States, January 2018 

snip.... 



*** 2017-2018 CWD TSE Prion UPDATE

Prion 2017 Conference Abstracts CWD

 2017 PRION CONFERENCE 

First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress 

Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1 

University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen 

This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves. 

Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice. 

At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation. 

PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS 

Subject: PRION 2017 CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS VIDEO 

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS 

*** PRION 2017 CONFERENCE VIDEO 



CWD TSE Prion Zoonosis to squirrel monkey and macaque


TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT 

First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress


SATURDAY, JULY 29, 2017 

Risk Advisory Opinion: Potential Human Health Risks from Chronic Wasting Disease CFIA, PHAC, HC (HPFB and FNIHB), INAC, Parks Canada, ECCC and AAFC 



CWD TSE Prion Zoonosis to squirrel monkey and macaque



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

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