Thursday, April 19, 2012

Wendy Grant, who has died aged 89, was a neuropathologist who became one of the first scientists to warn the public that BSE, also known as Mad Cow Disease

Wendy Grant

Wendy Grant, who has died aged 89, was a neuropathologist who became one of the first scientists to warn the public that BSE, also known as Mad Cow Disease, could be incubating in the human population.


Wendy Grant
Image 1 of 2
May 1990: In one of the most celebrated images of the BSE crisis, Agriculture minister John Selwyn Gummer and his 4 year old daughter Cordelia tuck into beefburgers on a visit to the East Coast Boat Show. Photo: PA
Wendy Grant
2 OF 2 Wendy Grant
The disease was first identified in cows in 1985. Two years later government scientists suggested the most likely source was cattle feed made from the remains of dead sheep with scrapie, a similar brain disease. In 1988 John MacGregor, then agriculture minister, imposed a ban on cattle feed derived from dead animals.


A month before the ban came into force, however, a junior doctor, Tim Holt, became the first to suggest, in an article in the British Medical Journal, that BSE might pose a significant threat to human health, after he and a colleague discovered that some butchers were selling cow brains for human consumption. He suggested that the use of brains in British food should be banned.


Wendy Grant, a retired consultant neuropathologist and an expert in slow viruses (associated with diseases with long incubation periods of months to years) was alarmed by Holt’s piece, particularly when she discovered, through slaughterhouse workers, that cattle brains were being added to meat products such as pies, pâtés and stock cubes. As one of the few people to have read the literature on scrapie and the human equivalent, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), she realised that government assurances about BSE, “namely 'we have lived with scrapie for two and a half centuries and it has not done us any harm’,” were based on the false premise that cattle brains and sheep brains were dealt with in the same way at abattoirs, “which they obviously were not”. Humans, she argued, had not been seriously exposed over the centuries to the scrapie agent as sheep brains are seldom removed to be eaten. But when she wrote to the government pressing the need for an inquiry into the dangers of contamination, she was ignored.


In February 1989 a report by a committee chaired by Sir Richard Southwood highlighted “unnatural feeding practices” in modern intensive farming but concluded that it was “most unlikely” that BSE might be transmitted to humans, though the risk could not be entirely ruled out. The day the report was published Wendy Grant appeared on the BBC warning that infected tissues of cattle were still going into human food. The risks of humans contracting the disease were being underplayed, she maintained, pointing out that experimental work on scrapie-infected brains had revealed that it is very easy to infect almost any mammal, including apes, “and we are just another ape”. “Who knows?” she added, “some of us may be incubating it already.”


The government’s immediate response to growing public concern was to impose a ban on the use of offal in baby foods, but in an article Wendy Grant accused it of using baby foods “to divert the public from thinking about other foods and thus to imply they are safe, which they are not”. The official inquiry into the BSE scandal later identified her article as one of the influences that drove the government towards the decision in November 1989 to ban the use of cows’ brain and spinal cord for human consumption.


As ministers and the food industry battled to reassure consumers that British beef was “perfectly safe” and that eating it carried “no conceivable risk”, Wendy Grant, like other scientists involved, found herself the victim of a smear campaign, treated with hostility by Ministry of Agriculture officials and accused of being “out of date”.



But she refused to go away. When, in 1990, she discovered that, under pressure from the meat lobby, ministers had agreed that brains could be removed from cattle by splitting open the skulls, she pointed out that this frequently resulted in bits of brain being splattered on to meat destined for human consumption. Slaughtered cattle, she said, should be decapitated and the intact heads incinerated.
In 1994 she described it as “incomprehensible” that the brains of calves under six months old were still being allowed into the human food chain and called for an immediate ban: “We should not be eating the offal even from calves, because we do not yet know whether the disease is passed from mother to calf,” she said. Two years later government scientists confirmed that cows could indeed pass on BSE to their calves.



The turning point came after the first recorded death from what was later described as new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), on May 21 1995. Within a year 10 cases had been identified and on March 20 1996, the Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell made the announcement that these cases were most probably linked to the consumption of BSE-infected beef or beef products. In June, in the face of a worldwide ban on exports of British beef imposed by the EU, the government agreed to implement a more thoroughgoing slaughter programme and more effective removal of potentially infective materials from carcases.



The announcement of a public inquiry into the affair under the senior judge Lord Phillips in 1997 was welcomed by campaigners and when it was published in 2000, it vindicated Wendy Grant and other scientists who had persisted in voicing their concerns. The report concluded that the government had misled the public about the dangers of British beef and the chances of mad cow disease being spread to humans for years. It also said that bureaucratic delays had hampered the response to the crisis.
But Wendy Grant only felt able to give the report a qualified welcome: If action had been taken to ban cattle brains from the human food chain in 1989 when she had first warned of the possibility of transmission, there would have been fewer vCJD victims: “They should have listened to me,” she said. Since vCJD was first reported in 1996, a total of 217 patients from 11 countries have been identified. Altogether, since the disease became notifiable in 1996, 176 people in Britain have died from the disease, but uncertainties relating to the potential length of the incubation period complicate predictions of the future number of cases.



Helen Grant, always known as Wendy, was born in Ealing, west London on May 11 1922. Her parents were involved in relief work with refugees and her father had spent some time in prison in the First World War, as a conscientious objector.



Wendy was educated at schools in France, Austria, New Zealand and finally at Bedales, where she became head girl. After taking a degree in Medicine at Cambridge, she did her clinical training at University College London. She decided to specialise in neuropathology and in 1970 joined the Middlesex Hospital as a consultant. In 1985 she moved to Charing Cross Hospital as a senior lecturer and honorary consultant in neuropathology.



A life-long opponent of boxing, Wendy Grant was able to demonstrate that the part of the brain most affected by punching corresponds with the areas attacked by other neurological conditions such as Parkinsons. When Cassius Clay, alias Muhammad Ali, degenerated into an incoherent wreck within 10 years of retiring and the sport’s defenders claimed he was not punch drunk but was suffering from Parkinson’s, she observed that if he was indeed suffering from Parkinsons, it was a convenient coincidence. “Boxing is bad for the brain full stop,” she said.



Wendy Grant married, in 1945, Alick Elithorn, but the marriage was later dissolved. She is survived by a son. A daughter predeceased her.




Wendy Grant, born May 11 1922, died March 14 2012




http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/medicine-obituaries/9205842/Wendy-Grant.html



THANKS WENDY ! R.I.P. ...TSS



 
The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 410


Dr Helen Grant



Issued 13/05/1999 (not scheduled to give oral evidence)




BSE INQUIRY



STATEMENT OF DR HELEN GRANT MD FRCP



1. My credentials in the matters of BSE and CJD are:



a. 1970-1982 Consultant Neuropathologist at the Middlesex Hospital.



b. 1985-1989 Consultant Neuropathologist at the Charing Cross Hospital.



c. I have carried out six autopsies on CJD victims and reported on a similar number of cerebral biopsies from CJD patients.



1. Through my interest in slow viruses (particularly with reference to multiple sclerosis) I was one of only a few people to be aware of both Scrapie and CJD in 1988.



2. I have never had any formal links with the farming community, renderers, pet food manufacturers, etc. However, slaughterhouse workers began telephoning me as early as February 1989 after they learned through the media of my concern and knowledge about TSEs. Several of them rang me because they had had no instructions from the Health and Safety Executive about precautions to be taken to avoid infection from BSE carcases. (I have kept some of the correspondence with these workers together with my list of precautions to be taken in abattoirs).



3. I asked the slaughterhouses workers in detail to explain the routine slaughtering practices and was astonished to learn that sheep’s brains were generally left inside the skull whereas cattle brains were routinely removed to be added to our "meat products" – meat pies, pates, tinned items and stock cubes. I therefore feared that this almost indestructible infective agent was being swallowed by all beef eaters in the UK in large doses which would inevitably infect genetically susceptible people.



4. I was horrified because I suddenly realised why Government assurances about BSE – namely "we have lived with scrapie for two-and-a-half centuries and it has not done us any harm so we won’t have any trouble with BSE" – were based on a false premise which was that cattle brains and sheep’s brains were dealt with in the same way in the abattoirs which they obviously were not. Since sheep’s brains were seldom removed from the skulls (which is why cattle caught scrapie in the first place) we humans have never been seriously exposed over the centuries to the scrapie agent. Simple economics is the reason: sheep’s brains are too small to make the intricate process of their removal worthwhile.



5. I appeared on the BBC nine o’clock television news on February 27, 1989 (the day the Southwood Report was published) in my capacity as consultant neuropathologist at Charing Cross hospital. I was asked among other things to comment on the possible human hazard of BSE and I warned that I thought there was a risk because cattle brains were going into our food chain. I added: "Who knows? Some of us may be incubating it already." Some of us were.



6. I was called to give evidence to the House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee on 13 June 1990 (IBD 1 Tab 7 p 42). On re-reading it, I see no reason to change anything in my evidence except the numbers of animals mentioned. The Government of the day was hardly disposed to ask my advice about BSE on a regular basis given my critical attitude since early 1989. But the then Labour Opposition, understandably anxious for information, turned to me frequently. Opposition Members included David Clark MP, Ron Davies MP and Ian McCartney MP. It was my technical information which helped Ron Davies MP to make his effective speech about BSE in the House of Commons on 17 May 1989 (M 7 Tab 7). Shortly afterwards, the Minister for Agriculture, John MacGregor, announced that legislation would be brought in to ban all cattle brains from human food (YB 89/6.13/5.1-5.2). The long summer recess delayed this legislation and the "specified offals" ban was finally enacted on 9 November 1989 (L2 Tab 4) (9 February 1990 in Scotland) (L10 Tab 9). Of course this was more than a year (15 months) after cattle had been protected in the same way.



7. Apart from my involvement with CJD I have of course been interested in that worldwide scourge, multiple sclerosis (MS). This led me to ponder the question of "slow virus infection – now labelled "prion infection" (an inaccurate title. In my opinion prion is a short title for an organism which causes Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) such as scrapie, CJD, BSE, Kuru and others. Prion diseases has therefore become widely used instead of the cumbersome alternative (YB 94/4.25/10.1)) – which is one of the aetiological factors involved in MS. Scrapie, the ovine TSE, was then and still is by far the most extensively researched slow virus infection. I therefore read up all the papers on the subject as they appeared during the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s and was therefore immediately aware of the human hazard posed by the BSE catastrophe. Vets generally did not know about CJD (why should they?) and neuropathologists were mostly ignorant of scrapie. I happened to know about both in those early days due to my interest in "slow viruses".



8. I was in receipt of no extra funds beyond those provided by the NHS and the University of London to run my laboratories and pay my salary as a senior lecturer/honorary Consultant and I suffered no constraints over my publications, lectures to my students, or statements to the media. However, I became increasingly aware after 1988 that questioning official dogma about BSE brought difficulties to one’s career. I was myself about to retire from the Charing Cross Hospital, where I worked as a Consultant Neuropathologist, but I observed with horror that the good reputations of dissenting scientists in the field, not least Dr Stephen Dealler and especially Dr Harash Narang were systematically undermined.



9. My primary function has been to teach medical under-graduates and post-graduates about diseases of the brain and nervous system and, of course, to fulfil my clinical functions as a consultant neuropathologist at two London teaching hospitals. This, of course, meant that I conducted both biopsies and autopsies including those on patients with CJD: it was not primarily to publish scientific articles. My scientific publications include only one case which I think in retrospect may be CJD before that was known to be an infection with this agent. ("Post Traumatic Dementia": Helen C Grant, Behrman et al. Archiv für Psyciatre und Zeitschrift für die ges. Neurologie. 1965; 207: 128) More importantly I have carried out several biopsies and autopsies on CJD patients. My duties also included the initiation and supervision of research projects. When my trainees and PhD students published their resulting scientific papers I took the view that the work was theirs, they should get the credit (not I) and therefore I made it a matter of principle not to add my name as co-author.



10. I corresponded frequently from February 1989 onwards with Government ministers including John MacGregor, Donald Thomson, Gillian Shepherd and Angela Browning. But I received only short and reassuring replies containing what I believed to be inaccurate information. Because official bodies treated my early warnings with hostility, I soon learned that the only way to convey my concerns was to contribute relevant letters to the broadsheet newspapers and to speak to responsible members of the press, the broadcasting services and informed members of Opposition parties.



11. Since February 1989 I have answered innumerable letters from members of the public understandably anxious – if not panicky – about the effect on their diets of the outbreak. They came/come from a cross-section of the community: parents ("is the milk safe?"), restaurateurs, doctors, butchers, journalists, Education Committees. Since I retired finally in March 1989 I have had the time to answer them all eventually.



12. The BSE/CJD problem is quite incomprehensible without knowledge of the facts set out in Annex 1. The infective agent has unique and sinister properties.



Issued on behalf of the witness by:



The BSE Inquiry Press Office 6th Floor Hercules House Hercules Road London SE1 7DU Fax: 0171 803 0893 Website: http://www.bse.org.uk Email: inquiry@bse.org.uk



 http://web.archive.org/web/20071014074839/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s410.pdf




annex 1 (wiped clean from internet)



http://web.archive.org/web/20050117205909/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws




 however, my files have this ;



 ANNEX 1 to witness statement 410 of Dr. Helen Grant



Annex 1



Unique Properties of the scrapie/BSE/CJD Agent, the so-called "prion"
A. The transmissible organism which causes all the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) -- scrapie, BSE, CJD and Kuru -- is almost indestructible, unlike any other virus, bacterium, protozoon, fungus or parasite. For example, it still transmits scrapie after being 'fixed' in formaldehyde for ten years. Heating it to a very high temperature, exposing it to enormous doses of ultraviolet light, or to ionising radiation, do not affect it. Incineration is the only way of destroying it and even then the temperature must be very high indeed.




B. It proliferates only in the brain, eyes, spinal cord, pituitary and, in some mammals, the placenta. The transmission of these diseases is dose-related and although the virus usually enters the bloodstream from the stomach, and then visits all tissues for a few hours, it lingers and proliferates only in the brain etc. The red meat (muscle) of BSE-infected cattle has never transmitted the disease in the laboratory and we have not had any trouble from eating scrapie-infected muscle over the centuries.




C. It lurks for years in an outwardly completely healthy individual.




D. During this long 'incubation period' the brain etc. is infective which is why it was necessary to ban the brains etc. of all cattle from human foods.




E. It raises no antibodies -- which might then be tested for -- in the infected host.




F. There is officially no live test to reveal infected individuals. "Officially" because a live (urine) test has recently been devised and has been used successfully in 15 out of 15 humans who were subsequently shown to have suffered CJD. MAFF's vets refuse to make use of this live test and denigrate it whenever they are asked about it. It could also be used to screen blood donors.




G. Individuals' susceptibility to this organism is genetically determined. Not all types of sheep develop scrapie; not all types of cattle develop BSE and only some humans -- those of an unusual genotype -- will, if infected, develop CJD.




H. Scrapie, the orginal disease in sheep, has been easily transmitted by mouth to many experimental mammals including primates.




Humans are primates.




Items b (placenta), c, d and f establish that the Government's present 'culling' policy, which is not based on science, cannot possibly eradicate BSE.




 snip...end...tss





Subject: ANNEX 1 to Witness statement 410 of Dr. Helen Grant


Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2000 15:58:39 -0600


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>


Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de>


To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de



######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE> #########



Greetings List Members,



I have often wondered about scrapie and it's possible relationship to sporadic CJD. A few things I thought interesting in this statement from Dr. Helen Grant, I would like to share with you.....snip...end...tss




556 In the first place there was the public reaction to the Report. This started with a broadcast on the day the Report was published from Dr Helen Grant, a consultant neuropathologist at Charing Cross Hospital in London, who commented on the risk posed by cattle brains that were going into the human food chain. In an article in The Guardian on 2 March 1989, she suggested that the Government was concentrating on baby food ‘to divert the public from thinking about other foods and thus to imply that they are safe, which they are not’.




 The press contrasted MAFF’s statement with views expressed by Dr Helen Grant, Consultant Neuropathologist:




My gut feeling is that some genetically susceptible people may have become infected with material by eating meat products.





Sunday, May 18, 2008


BSE Inquiry DRAFT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DFA


BSE Inquiry DRAFT FACTUAL ACCOUNTS DFA's




Sunday, May 18, 2008


BSE, CJD, and Baby foods (the great debate 1999 to 2005)





Sunday, May 18, 2008




BSE INQUIRY DFA







R.I.P. DR. GRANT !!!






1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.


Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.


Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.


snip...


The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.


PMID: 6997404





12/10/76


AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE


Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY


snip...


A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries. The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep. It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible. Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates.


One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias" Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.


snip...


76/10.12/4.6






Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.


Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).


Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC. Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0


Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)


C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland


SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).






Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.


Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).


Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC. Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0


Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)


C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland


SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).





Wednesday, February 16, 2011


IN CONFIDENCE


SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES


IN CONFIDENCE






why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $


snip...


5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.


snip...


R. BRADLEY







BSE: TIME TO TAKE H.B. PARRY SERIOUSLY


If the scrapie agent is generated from ovine DNA and thence causes disease in other species, then perhaps, bearing in mind the possible role of scrapie in CJD of humans (Davinpour et al, 1985), scrapie and not BSE should be the notifiable disease. ...







Thursday, November 18, 2010


Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform encephalopathy following passage in sheep






Wednesday, January 19, 2011


EFSA and ECDC review scientific evidence on possible links between TSEs in animals and humans Webnachricht 19 Januar 2011






Monday, June 27, 2011


Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease







RESEARCH


Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 5, May 2011


Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep


Marion M. Simmons, S. Jo Moore,1 Timm Konold, Lisa Thurston, Linda A. Terry, Leigh Thorne, Richard Lockey, Chris Vickery, Stephen A.C. Hawkins, Melanie J. Chaplin, and John Spiropoulos


To investigate the possibility of oral transmission of atypical scrapie in sheep and determine the distribution of infectivity in the animals’ peripheral tissues, we challenged neonatal lambs orally with atypical scrapie; they were then killed at 12 or 24 months. Screening test results were negative for disease-specifi c prion protein in all but 2 recipients; they had positive results for examination of brain, but negative for peripheral tissues. Infectivity of brain, distal ileum, and spleen from all animals was assessed in mouse bioassays; positive results were obtained from tissues that had negative results on screening. These fi ndings demonstrate that atypical scrapie can be transmitted orally and indicate that it has the potential for natural transmission and iatrogenic spread through animal feed. Detection of infectivity in tissues negative by current surveillance methods indicates that diagnostic sensitivity is suboptimal for atypical scrapie, and potentially infectious material may be able to pass into the human food chain.


SNIP...


Although we do not have epidemiologic evidence that supports the effi cient spread of disease in the fi eld, these data imply that disease is potentially transmissible under fi eld situations and that spread through animal feed may be possible if the current feed restrictions were to be relaxed. Additionally, almost no data are available on the potential for atypical scrapie to transmit to other food animal species, certainly by the oral route. However, work with transgenic mice has demonstrated the potential susceptibility of pigs, with the disturbing fi nding that the biochemical properties of the resulting PrPSc have changed on transmission (40). The implications of this observation for subsequent transmission and host target range are currently unknown.


How reassuring is this absence of detectable PrPSc from a public health perspective? The bioassays performed in this study are not titrations, so the infectious load of the positive gut tissues cannot be quantifi ed, although infectivity has been shown unequivocally. No experimental data are currently available on the zoonotic potential of atypical scrapie, either through experimental challenge of humanized mice or any meaningful epidemiologic correlation with human forms of TSE. However, the detection of infectivity in the distal ileum of animals as young as 12 months, in which all the tissues tested were negative for PrPSc by the currently available screening and confi rmatory diagnostic tests, indicates that the diagnostic sensitivity of current surveillance methods is suboptimal for detecting atypical scrapie and that potentially infectious material may be able to pass into the human food chain undetected.


Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 5, May 2011








Thursday, March 29, 2012

atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012

NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html






Monday, April 16, 2012





Continuing Enhanced National Surveillance for Prion Diseases in the United States

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/04/continuing-enhanced-national.html

Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68


Comment from Terry Singeltary

Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document Type: Public Submission

This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products

Docket ID: APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68


Topics: No Topics associated with this document

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Document Subtype: Public Comment

Status: Posted

Received Date: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Date Posted: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Comment Start Date: March 16 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time

Tracking Number: 80fdd617

First Name: Terry

Middle Name: S.

Last Name: Singeltary

City: Bacliff

Country: United States

State or Province: TX

Organization Name: CJD TSE PRION

Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS




Comment:

comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001 Greetings USDA, OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY. what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen, would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again. I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al, it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe. IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor. SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS


SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Attachment WORD FILE ;










Sunday, March 11, 2012



APHIS Proposes New Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Import Regulations in Line with International Animal Health Standards Proposal Aims to Ensure Health of the U.S. Beef Herd, Assist in Negotiations








Wednesday, April 4, 2012






Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68













pink slime and a ship of fools, with Governor Rick Perry at the helm.



john gummer of England, force fed his daughter mad cow beef. a few years later, a young friend of theirs (23) died from mad cow disease. NOW, Governor Rick Perry, shows he is as big a fool as John Gummer.












see more on this sad sad saga here ;




Wednesday, March 14, 2012



PINK SLIME, MRM’s, BSE AKA MAD COW DISEASE, AND THE USDA NSLP








Sunday, August 28, 2011


Rick Perry, Texas, BSE aka mad cow disease, CJD, and 12 years of lies there from








BY the way, ammonia treated beef DOES NOT KILL MAD COW DISEASE !!!






> > > Ackerman says downed cattle are 50 times more likely to have mad cow disease (also known as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE) than ambulatory cattle that are suspected of having BSE. Of the 20 confirmed cases of mad cow disease in North America since 1993, at least 16 have involved downer cattle, he said. < < <




don’t forget the children...



PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation (including TEXAS) dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens.



who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???



WAS your child exposed to mad cow disease via the NSLP ???



SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE










DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???

you can check and see here ;








Saturday, March 5, 2011


MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA






Sunday, February 12, 2012


National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (August 19, 2011) including Texas






Monday, April 16, 2012


Continuing Enhanced National Surveillance for Prion Diseases in the United States











TSS

Thursday, July 22, 2010

BSE INQUIRY DFA 18 COSMETICS

From: TSS

Subject: Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [Docket No. 2004N-0081] RIN 0910-AF47

Date: April 17, 2008 at 2:41 pm PST


http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/dockets/98fr/05-17693.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/dockets/04n0081/04N-0081_emc1148-02.pdf



http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/fr/2004/071404BSEFDA1.htm



http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-17693.pdf



In experimentally infected cattle, brain and spinal cord were again been confirmed to be infectious, but in addition the distal ileum (lower small intestine) also contained significant amounts of infectivity(31, 32). Two key ganglia, which are key intermediate points linking the central and peripheral nervous systems, namely TAFS 3 the trigeminal and dorsal root ganglia (DRG), were also clearly infectious(32, 33). This is not surprising given their close association with central nervous tissue. Peripheral nerves have also been demonstrated to become positive after the brain and spinal cord(1, 19). Completion of bioassay studies has also enabled a better understanding of the sequence of events, and rate of accumulation of infectivity, especially in relation to ileum, brain and spinal cord(1,2), and have confirmed the basic assumptions upon risk management policy were based.

PAGE 3


http://www.tseandfoodsafety.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_SPECIFIED%20RISK%20MATERIALS_2009_feb.pdf




Thursday, April 17, 2008

Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [Docket No. 2004N-0081] RIN 0910-AF47 [Federal Register: April 17, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 75)] [Rules and Regulations] [Page 20785-20794] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr17ap08-7]


http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/use-of-materials-derived-from-cattle-in.html




Monday, February 01, 2010

Import Alert 17-04 BSE CJD HIGH RISK TISSUES, Nutritional Supplements and Cosmetics

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-17-04-bse-cjd-high-risk.html




SEE HISTORY OF COSMETICS AND MAD COW TYPE DISEASE


-------- Original Message --------


Subject: Docket No. 2004N-0081 and or RIN number RIN-0910-AF47 Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [comment submission]

Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2004 16:08:38 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." T

o: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov

CC: burt.pritchett@fda.gov, Agriculture@mail.house.gov

COMMENT SUBMISSION [Docket No. 2004N-O081] RIN-0910--AF47 Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics

http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/04n-0081-nir0001.pdf


Greetings FDA,

I would kindly like to comment on the potential for TSE transmission from cosmetics to humans and why I think that ALL animal by-products should be excluded from cosmetics. IF we look at the TSE 'KURU'. Kuru is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy that was identified in Papua New Guinea in the late 1950s. Several thousand cases of the disease occurred during a period of several decades. Epidemiologic investigations implicated ritual endocannibalistic funeral feasts as the likely route through which the infectious agent was spread. The incubation period in females was estimated to be shorter than that in males. The shortest incubation periods were estimated in adult women, who may have been exposed to the largest doses of infectious material. MY question is, was the woman exposed to larger doses, are was it the route of the agent that may have been the factor of shorter incubation in woman, or both?

What is Kuru? Kuru is a rare and fatal brain disorder that occurred at epidemic levels during the 1950s-60s among the Fore people in the highlands of New Guinea. The disease was the result of the practice of ritualistic cannibalism among the Fore, in which relatives prepared and consumed the tissues (including brain) of deceased family members. Brain tissue from individuals with kuru was highly infectious, and the disease was transmitted either through eating or by contact with open sores or wounds. Government discouragement of the practice of cannibalism led to a continuing decline in the disease, which has now mostly disappeared.

snip...

PLEASE NOTE the later ''or by contact with open sores or wounds.''

and the disease was transmitted either through eating or by contact with open sores or wounds.

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health_and_medical/disorders/kuru.htm


the Fore women would scoop the brains of their dead relatives out of their skulls by hand before cooking. They then wiped the residual liquid and cadaver tissue over their paint-daubed bodies, leaving it caked in their hair and on their bodies for weeks after a mortuary feast.

Jennifer Cooke: kuru deaths continue in 1999

Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday, August 28, 1999

TSE INFECTION does takes place when the skin surface has been broken by scarification (Taylor et al, 1996).

The transmission of KURU into animals supported the belief that the disease had been transmitted through ceremonial cannibalistic rituals in New Guinea with a possible route of spread involving handling fresh tissue and inoculation through mucous membranes and wounds including skin abrasions (Gajdusek, 1977)

Masters, C.J., Gajdusek, D.C. and Gibbs, C.J., (1980). The spongiform encephalopathies: the natural history of CJD and its relationship to kuru and scrapie.

* Gajdusek D.C. (1996). Kuru: From the New Guinea field journals 1957-1962. Grand Street, 15:6-33

* Gajdusek D.C. (1973). Kuru in the New Guinea Highlands. In Spillane JD (ed): Tropical Neurology. New York, Oxford University Press.

* Gajdusek D.C., Gibbs C.J., and M. Alpers (1966). Experimental transmission of a kuru-like syndrome to chimpanzees. Nature, 209:794.

* Lindenbaum S. (1979). Kuru Sorcery. Mountain View, Ca, Mayfield Publishing Company.

SCCNFP/0724/03, final THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON COSMETIC PRODUCTS AND NON-FOOD PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR CONSUMERS OPINION CONCERNING USE OF SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL IN COSMETICS CLARIFICATION FOR TALLOW DERIVATIVES adopted by the SCCNFP on 30 July 2003 by means of the written procedure SCCNFP/0724/03, final Opinion on the Use of specified risk material in cosmetics - Clarification for tallow derivatives

____________________________________________________________________________ _________________


2 1. Background

snip...

http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_risk/committees/sccp/documents/out229_en.pdf



4. For GBR-C III and IV countries, tallow derivatives are safe if, in addition to the above (3), the specific risk materials have been removed and are not used for the production of tallow/tallow derivatives.

PLEASE NOTE, under the old BSE GBR, the USA would be re-classified as at least a GBR III risk assessment, if not a GBR IV in my opinion due to the misgivings from USDA/APHIS et al, some documented below in my references from Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission).

Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE - Risk of USA (July 2000) (220kb)

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out137_en.pdf



snip...end


Subject: DFA 18 Cosmetics...[There have been reports of BSE outbreaks in Germany, France, and even in the U.S.A., a prime market for Jersey cattle]

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Mon, 1 Nov 1999 09:28:04 -0600

Content-Type: text/plain

Parts/Attachments: text/plain (66 lines)

Reply

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA --

Greetings,

I have been reading over the latest DFA 18, about cosmetics, and the possible route of BSE, through this source. Several interesting comments I find, that have brought several questions in mind, ones in which I have asked before, and still no answer. The CDC refuses to answer any of my questions through their site, and no one else seems to know the answer. Is the U.S.A. considered to be B.S.E. free, by other Countries? I asked this question to Dr. Detwiler, her reply was; "To the best of my knowledge there are no countries in the world which restrict any animals or animal products from the United States due to a risk from BSE. I am not sure if all such countries are using the term BSE free"...

The reason in bringing this up, I find several statements in this draft, that pertains to this, statements that I find quite interesting;

Page 24, DFA 18, -- "the line taken on cosmetics including sourcing from overseas was based on that given for licensed medicinal products by a group that included Drs. Kimberlin, Watson and Will, as well as other MAFF officials. There is no question that the UK is an "infected area": the only question is whether other countries should be included too. The Licensing Authority, quite reasonably in my view, feels they can only insist on sourcing in Countries where there is no evidence of BSE and the veterinary service and reporting system is adequate to detect it were it is present. Most manufacturers of mainline pharmaceuticals are not risking having to change sources yet again and so are looking to Australasia. If the CVO thinks he has enough evidence, _say concerning the USA_, to persuade the CSM, CDSM etc to advise more strongly against sourcing there too, he should present that evidence in a convincing form and in writing. I do not see this as a matter for our group, since there are statutory responsibilities under the Medicines Act. What we should do is ensure consistent advice is given for those borderline products (like these "cosmetics" with medicinal claims) that currently fall outside that Act."

Page 60, DFA 18, cosmetics -- 4. If it is possible for humans to contract "mad cow" disease from cosmetics, the risk is greater from "exotica" products because, unlike soap ingredients, the ingredients are not subject to repeated boiling and some are just merely chilled. MAFF have advised the CTPA that the only safe source is Australasia. Along with other European countries, France and Germany have imported from the UK infected feedstuff and live cattle. There have been reports of BSE outbreaks in Germany and France and _even in the USA_, a prime market for Jersey cattle. The Germans claim that they have "cured" their infected cattle by bathing them in a special dip they have developed but MAFF say there is no magic German cure. The French are masters at suppressing bad news. However, their higher scientific committee has issued "approved BSE guidelines" for French industry to follow. These guidelines cover, amongst other things, cosmetic products and are based on guidelines issued by MAFF. The French have not credited MAFF at all and are touting their guidelines around the Commission.

I suppose my question would still be, does the EU, and or all the rest of the European Countries, consider the U.S.A. to be B.S.E. Free?

------------------ http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/~listserv/ -------------------


https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9911&L=BSE-L&P=R270&1=BSE-L&9=A&I=-3&J=on&X=2D25604264697D83A3&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&d=No+Match%3BMatch%3BMatches&z=4



Subject: COSMETICS, TOILETRY AND THE PERFUME INDUSTRY & B.S.E.

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Sun, 3 Sep 2000 10:55:19 -0700

Content-Type: text/plain

Parts/Attachments: text/plain (305 lines)

Reply

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List Members,

Human transmission: There are some in the media and even the medical profession who are trying to make connections between BSE and the human disorder CJD. There is _no_ evidence of any association nor would we expect any cases by now even were BSE to be transmissible to humans. Dr Wills' study (see 2i above) will monitor the situation for the next decade or two.

I thought i would break off the vaccines & BSE related issues just briefly, to show you another fine example of the, hmmmmmmmm, i will not use _cover-ups_, because people cannot accept that, even if that is where the truth lies. So i will call them, the _purposely miss judgements_, or _happen-stances of mega-ignorance_.

kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

=======================================================================

dti

Miss Marion Kelly Cosmetic, Toiletry and Perfumery Association 35 Dover Street London W1X3RA

Department of Trade and Industry

10-18 Victoria Street London SW1H ONN

Enquiries 01-215 5000

Telex 8811074 DTHQ G

01 215 3324

1 February 1990

Dear Marion

As you know there is no record of bovine spongiform encepalopathy crossing to humans, but we need to take precautions to avoid any risk.

There a number of cosmetric products on sale in the United Kingdom such as anti-ageing creams that contain extracts of bovine offal, primarily from spleen and Thymus.

The purpose of this letter is to ask you to ask your members to eliminate any risk by reformulating such products to eliminate these extracts, or alternatively to use material derived from cattle reared outside the UK, Eire or the Channel Islands.

Please let me know if you have any trouble persuading your members to do so.

Yours sincerely

R J ROSCOE

CONSUMER SAFETY UNIT

ROOM 407

90/02.01/14.1

==============

BSE110/1 0080

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY HANNIBAL HOUSE Room No ELEPHANT AND CASTLE LONDON SE1 6TE

1 February 1990

Mr R Roscoe Consumer Affairs Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1

Dear Richard

USE OF BOVINE OFFAL IN COSMETICS

I am replying to your request for advice on the safety of the use of extracts of bovine offal in certain cosmetics, such as skin products claimed to have 'anti-ageing' properties with respect to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). As you are aware there are a number of cosmetic products on sale in the UK that contain small amounts of such extracts, primarily from spleen and thymus.

we accept that the risk of transmission is likely to be remote, but believe that it would be prudent to eliminate any risk by reformulating such products. Alternatively if the incorporation of bovine extracts is retained, material derived from cattle reared outside the UK, Eire or the Channel Islands should be used.

We would be grateful if you would transmit these recommendations to industry via the Trade Association CTPA.

I attach background briefing prepared by medical colleagues from those sections most involved with consideration of BSE in DH, together with a copy of the Southwood report.

Please let me know if you need any further information.

Yours sincerely

DR R J FIELDER

Enclosure

90/2.1/7.1

===========

BSE110/1 0081

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

presence of Bovine Offals in Cosmetics and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

(1) Extracts of bovine spleen and thymus are present at between ca 0.1 and 5% in certain cosmetic preparations, for example certain products claimed to delay the signs of ageing of skin. The concern about the increasing incidence of BSE in cattle in the UK has made it necessary to reconsider the safety of such products.

The disease

BSE is a progressive neurological disorder in cattle, which results from infection with an "unconventional viral' agent. The first case was described in cows in 1986. By 19 January 1990 there had been 9436 confirmed cases in the UK on 5474 farms. There are no confirmed cases outside the British Isles, apart from a case in a cow recently exported from England. BSE is one of a family of spongiform encephalopathies which also include scrapie in sheep and kuru and Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (CJD) in man. The infection which leads to BBE appears to have been introduced into cattle from the contaminated feeding stuff, meat and bone meal, made partly from sheep offal: scrapie is endemic in sheep in the UK.

The causative agents of these diseases are thought to be unconventional transmissible agents (referred to variously as prions, virinos, filamentous viruses or slow viruses). They are extremely resistant to most denaturing processes eg heat, UV, high salt concentration, formalin and alkylating agents. The current DH guideline for treating items used on CJD patients is a temperature of 134-138 C (at 2 atmospheres) held for 18 minutes. They are also not removed by normal microbiological filters. It is thus unlikely that the mild processing techniques used to obtain the extracts used in cosmetics would remove the causative agents.

(2) Government action to date includes:

a. An expert working party was set up under Sir Richard Southwood and reported in February 1989. All their recommendations have been acted upon.

b. The disease has been made notifiable in cattle.

c. All suspect animals are slaughtered and carcases destroyed (50% compensation policy but 100% if diagnosis not confirmed); milk from such animals is also destroyed.

d. Sale or supply of animal protein from ruminants for feeding to ruminants prohibited - hopefully to prevent any new infections in cattle. This has had a major effect on the rendering industry.

e. Another committee was set up under Dr David Tyrrell to report on research needs. An interim report was published in January 1990 together with an announcement about additional funding. Much research work into the disease is currently in progress and additional studies are being planned.

Regulations in November 1989 introduced a ban on various

90/2.1/7.2

===========

BSEllO/1 0082

bovine offal for human consumption, going wider than the Southwood recommendations which were for such a ban to affect baby food only.

The Medicines Control Agency have gathered information from pharmaceutical companies about use of bovine ingredients in parenteral pharmaceuticals and issued interim guidelines. Many biological products and vaccines use such ingredients. The MCA are considering whether action on specific products is appropriate.

h. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is reviewing its guidance to those who come into direct contact with bovine 'risk' tissues. A press release for those who handle BSE carcases has been issued and one for abattoir workers is in preparation. The HSE ara also discussing risks from BSE exposure with the veterinary profession.

i. All UK cases of CJD will be monitored in a study to be conducted by Dr R G Will in Edinburgh, funded by the Department of Health: this should allow detection of any spread of infection to hummans, although this possibility is considered remote.

(3) Current live issues

Research: Dr Tyrell's interim report identified a large research programme classed as high priority. Almost all of this research falls to MAFF {Central Veterinary Labs} or the AFRC, although the MRC also has an interest. Substantial money has been made available for this work but research will be laborious and results will come slowly.

Food: There has been constant pressure on MAFF about the supposed risk to humans from eating beef and beef products. Infected animals who are incubating the disease but do not show any abnormalities cannot be detected at present and will be entering the human food chain. The offal ban removes the highest 'risk' tissues. Some critics may not be satisfied by this. However, others may argue the action to date is over the top, not demanded by the experts, and illogical since scrapie-infected sheep can still be eaten and doing so for the last 200 years has not caused harm to humans. We expect BSE agent to be resistant to irradiation as applied to food, as well as relatively resistant to cooking.

Other animals: There is no evidence that animals other than cattle (and domesticated, deer) have been or could be affected by BSE, other than experimentally, but there are pressures to extend the ruminant protein ban: at present pigs and poultry receive this sort of feed. Such action, as well as being hard to justify scientifically, would increase costs for the industry and cause perhaps insurmountable problems for abattoirs, who would find renderers no longer willing to accept offal. Many 1000's of tons of offal need to be disposed of daily.

Compensation: This has been set at 50% for BSE, although for some other diseases it is higher. Some critics believe this encourages evasion, with cows affected minimally being sent for human consumption. Even the current level of compensation is proving expensive for MAFF.

Exports: Some foreign countries have banned British exports of seman, embryos and livestock. The EC now no longer accepts live cattle over 6 months of age. The Germans are creating difficulties over beef exports too. The EC are also considering making BSE

90/2.1/7.3

=============

BSE110/1 0083

notifiable and banning ruminant protein feeding to rminants, as we have done here. At present, British meat and bone meat can still be exported and might spread infection overseas (MAFF claim importers have been warned that it is not regarded suitable for feeding to ruminants).

Human transmission: There are some in the media and even the medical profession who are trying to make connections between BSE and the human disorder CJD. There is _no_ evidence of any association nor would we expect any cases by now even were BSE to be transmissible to humans. Dr Wills' study (see 2i above) will monitor the situation for the next decade or two.

90/2.1/7.4

=========== [like i have said, they really did miss the boat on this whole ordeal. from day one, to date, and they still continue to deny the inevitable.] TSS

=========== [also, found this in this pile, so will just add...tss] ===========

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

I have been asked to provide a draft reply to the attached letter from Sir Richard Southwood to the Minister. The Minister has indicated that we must meet Sir Richard's points (a} on the need for him to be fully briefed as to developments and (b) on the urgency of making progress with the transmission study.

On (a), I would suggest that the draft reply should indicate that you will be in touch with Sir Richard regularly to keep him in the picture. On (b), I hope we can now tell Sir Richard that the arrangements for the purchase and relocation of the animals are under way.

A R Cruickshank

20 June 1989

Mr A J Lawrence

AH

cc Mr K C Meldrum Dr W A Watson Mr R C Lowson

89/6.20/8.1

============

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############


https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0009&L=BSE-L&P=R2540&1=BSE-L&9=A&I=-3&J=on&X=57C86A263C194B4411&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&d=No+Match%3BMatch%3BMatches&z=4



From: TSS (216-119-138-155.ipset18.wt.net)

Subject: FAT LIPS/SHINY HAIR/Creams (Cosmetics) PRETTY WOMEN $ MOVIE STARS $ MAD COW DISEASE ...

Date: June 10, 2001 at 8:24 am PST

Greetings ALL,

was reading a 'smut' magazine about the 'babes' and came across this article about the different movie stars 'fat lips' (collagen injections). something in the article caught my eye. ONE was Collagen and the other was HASK PLACENTA No-Rinse Treatment. (if containing animal tissues, and then running down into the eye's, seems like a potential transmission route, if you consider kuru and the fact transmission of that TSE agent via topical applications {rubbing of organs etc on skin, cuts etc...TSS}).

""Attention, Goldie Hawn: You might want to forget about more collagen infections for that full-lipped look. Collagen for the procedure usually comes from cows -- as in "mad cow disease". So what's a girl to do? Some docs are using an acid found in roosters' combs instead of collagen. Others use collagen from 'ELITE' herds that don't mix with common bovines. And one scientist is awaiting approval for a human collagen from the foreskin of infant boys -- further proof that beauty is only skin deep""-- 'The National Enquirer' 5/6/01


are these babes in far a 'rude' awakening. firstly, these so called 'ELITE' herds they speak of, are what they call, 'tissue donor herds', that are suppose to be fed 'only' certain products that _do not_ include ruminant feed of any sort. AND from the exact question i asked at the infamous '50 STATE EMERGENCY CONFERENCE CALL' of Jan, 9, 2001, sadly we find, there is absolutley, NO SUCH THING. It was all a joke. The 'partial' ruminant to ruminant feed ban of August 4, 1997, never was enforced, and most knew nothing about it, and/or chose to ignore it.


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/upcoming-bse-webinar-on-thursday-april.html


Hask Placenta® No-Rinse Hair Repair Treatment

Nature's protein treatment. Excellent for hair that is abused by relaxing, tinting, bleaching and exposure to the sun.

Price: US$4.95 Package: 5 fl oz (150 ml) Item No.: P8225 **discontinued** - replaced by Perm-Aid® No-Rinse Conditioning Treatment

Placenta, the most powerful natural protein for the hair instantly restores life and luster to day brittle hair.

Directions:

Shake well. Apply after shampooing. Use pump and spray until hair is saturated. Massage thoroughly. Do not rinse. Wait 3 minutes: proceed as usual with setting or styling.

Ingredients:

Water, SD Alcohol 40, Placental Protein, Cetrimonium Bromide, Lactic Acid, Fragrance, Stearamide MEA, Polysorbate 80, Phenoxyethanol, Methylparaben, Butylparaben, Propylparaben, Stearyl Imidazoline, Cetearyl Alcohol, Dimethicone, FD&C Yellow #5.

http://www.folica.com/shampoos/haskplacenta.htm


Hask Perm-Aid® Revitalizing Treatment

Special care for permed hair, also for chemically damaged and extremely abused hair.

Price: US$3.95 Package: 2.5 oz (70.94 grams) Item No.: P8216 Availability: **discontinued** recommend Perm-Aid No Rinse Conditioning Treatment

This product had been discontinued by the manufacturer, we recommend Perm-Aid® No Rinse Conditioning Treatment, which is more potent!

http://www.folica.com/shampoos/haskpermaid_revtre.htm


Part No : 1227 Description : Hask Placenta Treat.Vial 24/unit

This product is in stock, and will ships in one to two business day. If the order is received before 1:00 pm Pacific Time, usually ships on same business day.

http://www.beautycentury.com/mall/stockIS.asp?sku=1227


HASK PLACENTA products are leaders in the Deep Conditioner segment of Hair Care. Henna-n-Placenta Pacs are #13 in Unit Sales of ALL conditioners and #1 of all DEEP conditioners in the Drug Class*. Hask Placenta Instant Hair Repair, with No-Rinse treatment, is a top-10 unit seller*. National Media Support drives the brand and Hask’s strong professional heritage has consumer recognition.

http://www.ecrm-epps.com/Expose/V4_7/Table_Profiles/Alleghany.html


BSE INQUIRY

Use of Bovine offal in Cosmetics;


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20081105233036/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/02/01004001.pdf


http://web.archive.org/web/20040625033734/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/02/01007001.pdf


6. Information on the transfer of spongiform encephalopathies indicates that the risks from parenternal exposure are greater than orally; though the transfer through intact skin is probably unlikely, the effect of a cut or abrasion to the skin is unknown. ...


http://web.archive.org/web/20030516061153/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/26018001.pdf



http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102164040/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/29001001.pdf



http://web.archive.org/web/20030526094945/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/29015001.pdf



http://web.archive.org/web/20030515204421/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/31014001.pdf



*** (Third paragraph: The wording of this paragraph will raise NEW concerns which cannot be scientifically answered. We would ask that the third paragraph be OMITTED.)


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20081105233038/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/31014001.pdf



NOT FOR PUBLICATION


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102164021/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/06/00005001.pdf



(there may still be some strange products administered by injection that are trying to _evade_ the Medicines Act by calling themselves cosmetics. If _any_ of those involve bovine ingredients, they need to _comply_ with the CSM guidelines)...


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102164014/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/07/25003001.pdf



http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20081105233044/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/06/26003001.pdf


http://web.archive.org/web/20030529120226/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/06/30001001.pdf


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102164053/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/10/15002001.pdf


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102164025/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/10/31009001.pdf


BSE110/1 0180

RUMINANT-DERIVED MATERIAL IN COSMETICS

The Department of Health wishes to reinforce the advice given to the Cosmetics Industry in February 1990 (ref.)

It is possible that some ruminant-derived materials are being incorporated into cosmetics or beauty treatments which are then marketed as 'natural products.

The particular materials that should not under _ANY_ circumstances be used in the manufacturer of cosmetics or beauty treatments are:

1. bovine (cattle)-derived offals, or proteins derived from these offals. These offals are: brain, spinal cord, spleen, thymus, tonsils, intestines of Bovine offal (prohibition) regulations

2. ovine (sheep)-derived offals and ovine placenta.

In view of the current uncertainty about the incidence of infection with spongiform encephalopathy agents it is probably advisable that these recommendations apply to the above ruminant-derived materials of ANY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN...

31 October 1991

91/10.31/9.1

It also emerged from the 16- volume report of Lord Phillips, released on Thursday, that people who bought anti-aging cream may have exposed themselves to BSE unwittingly.

The report describes their use as “a potential pathway to infection” because some creams may have included cattle brain placenta.

http://www.sesahs.nsw.gov.au/albionstcentre/infection_control/newsletter6.htm


A CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE HAZARD OF GELATIN TO MAN IN RELATION TO THE TRANSMISSION OF BSE


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102120826/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac13/tab07.pdf



Subject: BSE aka MAD COW DISEASE AND TOPICAL APPLICATIONS COSMETICS (cuts/abrasions etc.)

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 16:51:36 -0700

Content-Type: text/plain

Parts/Attachments: text/plain (257 lines)

Reply

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings everyone,

since the debate on this ended abruptly, i thought some might be interested in the following;

TOSS =====

DOA 18

Cosmetics

snip...

73. On 29 January 1990 Dr Pickles sent a minute to Dr Singh, copied to Mr Love and Mr Maslin. Dr Pickles referred to a conversation about Dr Singh’s draft letter to Mr Roscoe, and stated:[73]

snip...

But I think application to broken skin is getting rather close to parenteral administration. Together with problems of policing the 6 month limit, and the fact that the ‘benefit’ from such material is so dubious, I would prefer to see a complete ban.’

snip...

75. On 29 January 1990 Mr Sloggem replied to Mrs Shersby’s minute of the same date. He said:[75]

“1. The advice from Dr Fielder seems fine to me. There could be a problem with abraded skin providing a route of entry. Spleen and placenta could well have high titres, assuming the analogy with scrapie holds good. Sourcing abroad would seem the sensible thing to do. Some tissues may have higher titres earlier than brain tissue eg gut, hence these are best avoided from British sources.

snip...

“… the line taken on cosmetics including sourcing from overseas was based on that given for licensed medicinal products by a group that included Drs Kimberlin, Watson and Will, as well as other MAFF officials. There is no question that the UK is an “infected area”: the only question is whether other countries should be included too. The Licensing Authority, quite reasonably in my view, feels they can only insist on sourcing in countries where there is no evidence of BSE and the veterinary service and reporting system is adequate to detect it were it present. Most manufacturers of mainline pharmaceuticals are not risking having to change sources yet again and so are looking to Australasia. If the CVO thinks he has enough evidence, say concerning the USA, to persuade the CSM, CDSM etc to advise more strongly against sourcing there too, he should present that evidence in a convincing form and in writing. I do not see this as a matter for our group, since there are statutory responsibilities under the Medicines Act. What we should do is ensure consistent advice is given for those borderline products (like these “cosmetics” with medicinal claims) that currently fall outside that Act.”


http://www.bse.org.uk/dfa/dfa18.htm

snip...


136. On 25 July 1991, Dr Pickles replied to Mr Murray’s request. She agreed that the geographical aspects needed updating. She said ‘[the] background briefing is not really appropriate in that form (it was not something I had intended should have gone to DTI in any case).’ She also suggested that it could be pointed out that there were potential concerns:[142]

‘* for workers in the cosmetic industry who may be exposed frequently to these materials, especially if inoculation injuries might occur and

* those who by repeated application particularly to thinned, scarified or diseased skin might absorb material including infective agent that way, also

* there may still be some strange products administered by injection that are trying to evade the Medicines Act by calling themselves cosmetics. If any of those involve bovine ingredients, they need to comply with the CSM guidelines.’

snip...

‘I have the feeling we are far too remote from the industry to make meaningful comments. Contacts via DOH/DTI do not inspire me with confidence. I would advise we need to know what bovine materials are really used in cosmetics and for what purposes. We either need to send someone into the industry (as I did for tripe, casings and rennet) or have a closer contact via the trade association. I am not satisfied yet that the industry is ‘in the clear’ and it is us that may shoulder some blame if it is later found ladies are rubbing cow brain or placenta on to their faces. It may not be our job but if we have any responsibility we need to get at the facts.’

snip...

‘Cosmetics

3. In February 1990 the Department of Health wrote to the Department of Trade and Industry, following a request for advice on the safety of using extracts of bovine offal in certain cosmetics. Placenta is used for its supposed anti-ageing properties. Gangliosides, spleen and thymus may also be used, although there is no firm knowledge on this.

4. DTI issued advice to the industry, via the Trade Association, to the effect that even though the risks were remote it would be prudent to reformulate these products or source from countries free from BSE. In this context it was agreed at the Tyrrell committee meeting on 28 June that DTI would be reminded that since BSE had been found in other countries their guidance to cosmetic manufacturers needed to be updated.

snip...

‘MK and JS said that the cosmetics of concern can be divided into two – 10% expensive ‘exotica’ which could contain the particular tissues of concern to DH such as cerebrocides, placenta (either human or other animal) and 90% are the routine products, many of which are based on collagen, elastin and gelatin. …

MK explained that the French cosmetics industry was soon to hold discussions with their Department of Health and it was likely that the use of placental material, particularly human, would be discontinued in any cosmetics. The main producers of ‘exotica’ were French and American, the products very expensive and therefore the companies would have the resources to ensure the safety of their products by safe sourcing eg from Australasia where there is no scrapie and no BSE. Small UK manufacturers would not be producing products containing animal materials but would rely on vegetable materials. They were not thought to be likely to be incorporating materials of concern, and this was also true for those producers of ‘natural’ products who would not necessarily be members of the CTPA.’

snip...

The delegation thought that cosmetic products applied to the mucous membranes or around the eyes were the most dangerous.

http://www.bse.org.uk/dfa/dfa18.htm

https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0109&L=BSE-L&P=R4117&1=BSE-L&9=A&I=-3&J=on&X=57C86A263C194B4411&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&d=No+Match%3BMatch%3BMatches&z=4


Subject: Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [Docket No. 2004N-0081] RIN 0910-AF47

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2008 12:46:56 -0500

Content-Type: text/plain

https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0804&L=BSE-L&P=R7115&1=BSE-L&9=A&I=-3&J=on&X=4C5F74434D94442225&Y=flounder9%40verizon.net&d=No+Match%3BMatch%3BMatches&z=4


Subject: CHINA TO START IMPORTING COSMETICS FROM COUNTRIES WITH BSE

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2007 13:05:42 -0500

Volume 7 Medicines and Cosmetics 8. Cosmetics and toiletries Introduction Exotica Standard topical products Collagen implants How the issue was handled

8.1 In this chapter we consider the Government's response to the risks posed by the use of bovine material in cosmetics. Cosmetics, as defined by the Cosmetics Products (Safety) Regulations 1996, include:

any substance or preparation intended to be placed in contact with any part of the external surfaces of the human body (that is to say, the epidermis, hair system, nails, lips and external genital organs) or with the teeth and the mucous membranes of the oral cavity with a view exclusively or mainly to cleaning them, perfuming them, changing their appearance, protecting them, keeping them in good condition or correcting body odours except where such cleaning, perfuming, protecting, changing, keeping or correcting is wholly for the purpose of treating or preventing disease. 1

8.2 Cosmetics using bovine materials fell into three categories: (i) products using lightly treated high-risk bovine offals: 'exotica'; (ii) standard topically applied products using heavily processed bovine by-products; and (iii) implants using bovine collagen.

Exotica

8.3 Concern about a risk of possible BSE contamination focused mainly on those cosmetic products commonly described as 'exotica'. These included 'premium priced facial skin care products' such as certain anti-ageing and anti-wrinkle creams. There was no ban on the use in them of animal material such as 'cellular extracts' that was deemed an unacceptable risk in food and medicines, and accordingly proscribed under the food safety and medicines safety legislation. Such material might be only lightly processed or simply chilled. Possible ingredients identified relatively early on were gangliocides extracted from the brain; and placental material, spleen and thymus. 2

Standard topical products

8.4 Although never considered a serious risk, questions were also raised about how to ensure the safety of more standard cosmetic products. These included the full range of topically applied cosmetics, ie, creams and toiletries applied to the skin, lips and eyelids, and included soaps, skin creams, shaving sticks and stick deodorants. Many of these used heavily processed bovine by-products such as collagen, elastin, gelatine and tallow derivatives. 3

Collagen implants

8.5 Concern was also expressed about bovine collagen used in implants. Although not mentioned in the highly condensed minutes of the CSM/BSC meeting of 2 November 1988, Dr Pickles's own note at the time records that this came up at the meeting as an area of concern: 'Some collagen implants of bovine origin as used by cosmetic clinics are not even licensed.' 4 Collagen products intended for correction of contour deficiencies of the skin were considered licensable under the Surgical Materials Order SI 1971 No. 1276. DH has told us that although collagen implants might have been used for 'cosmetic' reasons, this would have been under medical supervision as they were 'prescription only' medicines. 5

How the issue was handled

8.6 Although specifically identified in the Tyrrell Report in June 1989 as a small-scale user that might not be covered by the regulations and guidelines then in place, 6 the cosmetics industry was not itself the subject of advice or guidance until February 1990.

8.7 In January of that year Mr Richard Roscoe of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department with policy responsibility for the safety of cosmetics, had on his own initiative asked DH for advice about the risk from BSE associated with the use of bovine offal in certain cosmetics. 7 DH's advice was that although the risk of transmission of BSE was remote, it would be prudent to reformulate, or source bovine material from cattle reared outside the British Isles. 8 DTI passed this advice on to the cosmetics industry trade association, the Cosmetics, Toiletries and Perfumery Association (CTPA), which in turn informed its members. 9

8.8 SEAC considered the use of bovine material in non-food products generally in June 1991. 10 By that time, BSE had been identified in countries other than the UK, and it was suggested that the advice issued to the cosmetics industry in February 1990 should be updated to take this into account. Updated advice was not sent to the CTPA until April 1992. 11

8.9 One approach that was considered within DH was the introduction of a voluntary ban on bovine materials from countries in which cases of BSE had been reported. Such a ban, if it were to be introduced, would have to be implemented at EU level, so as not to fall foul of European law. The question of BSE and cosmetics was therefore taken forward in the EC Working Party on Cosmetics (ECWPC). Progress at EC/EU level was slow; by the end of October 1994 the Scientific Committee on Cosmetology (SCC) had produced only an interim statement suggesting that material from animals with the potential to transmit infectious agents should not be used in the manufacture of cosmetics. 12 In February 1995 the ECWPC decided that the existing Cosmetics Directive did not need alteration. 13 This decision was based in part on assurance by COLIPA, the European cosmetics trade association, that its members were following certain approved basic precautions on a voluntary basis. 14

8.10 When, in March 1996, the EU ban on the export from the UK of bovine products destined for use in cosmetic, medicinal and pharmaceutical products was introduced, 15 the CTPA conducted a survey of its members and reported that almost all had been using non-UK-sourced bovine material for some time. 16

8.11 In the sections that follow we look first at the regulatory framework on cosmetics safety, which was markedly different from that on either food or medicinal products safety. The sponsoring Department for the industry, which was also responsible for its regulation, was DTI. As we shall see, there was some confusion at various points in the sequence of events about the respective responsibilities of DTI and DH for minimising risks to human health from the production and use of cosmetic products.

8.12 In the final section of the chapter we review some lessons that emerge from the way BSE was handled.

http://web.archive.org/web/20010218202403/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapter8.htm#416223


Volume 7 Medicines and Cosmetics 8. Cosmetics and toiletries Regulatory framework Enforcement DTI handling of cosmetics DH's role in cosmetics safety

8.13 The regulation of cosmetics is based on the EU Cosmetics Directive (1976), which was implemented in the UK by regulations made under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Under this system, cosmetic products must meet various safety requirements, but, unlike medicinal products, they do not require a licence.

8.14 The Cosmetics Directive seeks to ensure the safety of cosmetics and their unhindered trade throughout the EU. In relation to safety, Article 2 provides:

Cosmetic products put on the market within the Community must not be liable to cause damage to human health when applied under normal conditions of use. 1

8.15 Dr Robin Fielder of DH told us that the Cosmetics Directive places the onus on manufacturers and suppliers to ensure that the product is safe for the use intended. 2

8.16 Member States have a duty to 'take all necessary measures to ensure that only cosmetic products which conform to [the Directive] may be put on the market'. 3 The Annexes to the Cosmetics Directive list substances that must not be used in cosmetics and substances whose use is regulated. They also contain lists of substances ('the prescribed lists') permitted for certain uses (preservatives, colourants, sun screens) and only these substances may be used for those purposes in cosmetic products. 4 The prescribed lists may be amended following consideration by the European Commission's Cosmetic Products Working Party, which consists of representatives from the Member States and the industry. DTI led for the UK on this with DH also having a role. The final decision is taken by the Committee on the Adaptation to Technical Progress, which is chaired by the Commission and consists of representatives from Member States. Both the Working Party and the Commission have access to the opinions of the Scientific Committee on Cosmetology (SCC), an independent multidisciplinary body of scientists appointed by the Commission to assess the safety of cosmetics ingredients, as well as to advice from their own national scientific advisers. 5

8.17 The Cosmetics Directive limits the action individual Member States can take to regulate cosmetics. 6 If a product complies with the relevant Annex, the UK Government cannot prohibit its use unless, on the basis of a 'substantiated justification', it represents a hazard to health. 7

8.18 Regulations made, in part, under section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 give effect to the Cosmetics Directive in UK law. The Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 1984 (made under a predecessor of the Act) were replaced on 1 January 1990 by the Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 1989 ('the 1989 Regulations').

8.19 The main provisions of the 1989 Regulations are as follows: 8

1.A cosmetic product shall not be liable to cause damage to human health when it is applied under normal conditions of use (reg. 3(1)). 2.No cosmetic product may contain any substance listed in column 2 of Schedule 1, unless it is only a trace that could not reasonably have been removed during or after manufacture (reg. 4(2)). 3.A cosmetic product must not contain any substance listed in column 2 of Schedule 2 unless specified requirements in that schedule are satisfied (reg. 4(3)). 4.The Secretary of State may authorise the use in a cosmetic product of any substance not listed in either schedule 1 or 2 (reg. 5(1)). In giving authorisation the Secretary of State may impose conditions relating to the use of the substance (reg. 5(2)). 5.There are various conditions and standards for labelling and packaging (reg. 6).

8.20 The Consumer Protection Act imposes a general safety requirement on all consumer goods. Section 10 of the Act makes it an offence to supply consumer goods that fail to comply with the general safety requirement. For this purpose, consumer goods fail to comply with the safety requirement if they are not reasonably safe having regard to all the circumstances. 'Safe' means that there is no risk (apart from one reduced to a minimum) that the goods will (whether immediately or later) cause death or personal injury to any person. 9

8.21 The Cosmetics Directive and the 1989 Regulations left only limited scope for the application of section 10 of the Act. Since the introduction of the General Product Safety Regulations 1994 10 there has been virtually no scope for its application.

8.22 In practice informal contact and voluntary cooperation played an important part in the regulation of the cosmetics industry.

Enforcement

8.23 DTI had policy responsibility for the safety of cosmetics in the UK. Day-to-day enforcement of safety regulations such as the 1989 Regulations fell to the trading standards departments of local authorities. 11

8.24 Supplying consumer goods that failed to comply with the general safety requirement or with certain requirements of safety regulations was an offence and punishable in the courts. 12

8.25 In addition, enforcement authorities (which for these purposes meant DTI and the trading standards departments of local authorities) had power to serve a suspension notice prohibiting the person on whom it was served from supplying goods for up to six months; power to apply to the court for a forfeiture order; 13 and power for an authorised officer of the enforcement authority to enter any premises, inspect any goods, or examine any procedure, or in appropriate circumstances to seize and detain goods. 14

8.26 The Secretary of State also had the power to serve a notice on a person prohibiting the person from selling consumer goods if the Secretary of State considered them to be unsafe (a prohibition notice), or requiring the person to publish a warning about such goods (a notice to warn). 15 However, these powers applied only to the person on whom the notice was served or against whom the order was sought, rather than to a general category of goods, and no power existed to recall products under these provisions. 16

8.27 DTI told us that it was unaware of any instance in which these powers had been used in respect of a BSE risk in cosmetics. 17

DTI handling of cosmetics

8.28 Within DTI overall responsibility for the safety of cosmetics lay with the Consumer Safety Unit (CSU). Within the CSU, the Chemical Hazards Section (CHS) had day-to-day responsibility for cosmetics. 18

8.29 Mr David Jones, a Grade 5 official, was Head of the CSU until 1995. Mr Roscoe, a Grade 7 official, was Head of the CHS from 1983 to 1992, with specific responsibility for ensuring the safety of cosmetics sold in the UK. 19 He was succeeded by Mr John Walker. Mrs M L Payne, a Higher Executive Officer in the CSU from 1990, was responsible for developing policy on regulation covering chemicals, including ingredients used in cosmetics. 20

8.30 The CTPA was the peak representative body for the UK cosmetics industry and the channel through which DTI distributed cautionary guidance on BSE to cosmetics manufacturers.

DH's role in cosmetics safety

8.31 Although DTI had overall regulatory responsibility for cosmetics, DH also played a role as DTI's adviser on toxicity. 21 The relevant Division in DH was MED TEP (Medical Toxicology Environmental Protection), 22 later evolving into the HEF M (Health Aspects of Environment and Food Medical), 23 which would give advice when necessary.

8.32 Mr Roscoe told us that whenever the CHS was alerted to the presence of a potentially 'risky' ingredient in a particular cosmetic product it would refer the matter to DH. 24 Upon receipt of advice from DH, the CHS would then decide on a course of action. According to Mr Roscoe, DTI would always act on this advice 'unless there were very strong reasons for not doing so'. 25

8.33 Mr Roscoe also told the Inquiry that he believed that when DH encountered a new risk it was its responsibility to pass on the information to DTI. 26

8.34 The DH adviser on toxicology over the period of concern was Dr Fielder, who was assisted by Dr Dewhurst (1988-90), Dr Gott (1991-93) and Ms Mulholland (1993-97). 27

http://web.archive.org/web/20010218200336/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteg2.htm


COSMETICS-further reading from the inquiry on this subject;


http://web.archive.org/web/20010218201247/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteg3.htm


http://web.archive.org/web/20010218201548/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptef4.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624184106/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapted5.htm


http://web.archive.org/web/20020328132354/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteb6.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624172330/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteb7.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624184940/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptea8.htm



Volume 7: Medicines and Cosmetics 8. Cosmetics and toiletries 1997/98

8.145 Although outside the period covered by the Inquiry, it is of interest to note the Cosmetics Directive was subsequently amended by Commission Directive 97/1/EC on 10 January 1997 to prohibit the use in cosmetics of:

Bovine, ovine and caprine tissues and fluids from the encephalon, the spinal cord and the eyes, and ingredients derived therefrom. 1 8.146 The Cosmetics Directive was further amended by Commission Directive 98/16/EC on 5 March 1998 to prohibit the use in cosmetics of: 2

(a) the skull, including the brain and eyes, tonsils and spinal cord of: - bovine animals aged 12 months, - ovine and caprine animals which are aged over 12 months or have a permanent incisor tooth erupted through the gum; (b) the spleens of ovine and caprine animals and ingredients derived therefrom. However, tallow derivatives may be used provided that the following methods have been used and strictly certified by the producer: - Transesterification or Hydrolysis at at least: 200ºC, 40 bars (40,000 hPa) for 20 minutes (glycerol and fatty acids and esters); - Saponification with NaOH 12 M (glycerol and soap); - Batch process: at 95ºC for three hours, or - Continuous process: at 140ºC, two bars (2000 hPa) for eight minutes or equivalent conditions.


http://web.archive.org/web/20010218200025/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteri.htm


http://web.archive.org/web/20020328151016/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapte10.htm


8.227 These matters stretch well beyond our remit. However, it appears to us, as it did to the Tyrrell Committee, that cosmetics were indeed a potential pathway for pathogens, and that not enough was known about this. Future occasions could arise when, as with BSE, there needs to be a means of turning off the tap at source, rather than catching droplets downstream. Consideration might usefully be given to what powers and processes would assist this.


http://web.archive.org/web/20030702111440/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapter9.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20020328140201/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteh2.htm


http://web.archive.org/web/20010218201146/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteh3.htm



9.63 Mr Bradley replied by letter dated 17 June 1990 to Dr Pickles's letter of 11 June. He stated in relation to A1d:

I have not got far with this. Where do fetal calves, placenta and uteri go and are any uses made of lymph nodes? Cosmetics, ointments, oils, indeed anything that is used on the skin (it could have a lesion) could presen an increased hazard. I have some concern over mesenteric lymph nodes though they are not eaten, though DOH/MAFF agreed earlier there was no need to include them in the offal ban. This is one to discuss in Committee. 34

I understand that there is concern on the Tyrrell Committee recommendation A1d on pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. This has never been considered a primary responsibility of MAFF although collaboration with the principals (DOH and industry) was anticipated.

I suspect the VMD approach will be to avoid or selectively reduce use of bovine tissues in medicinal products for animals. Presumably the authorities responsible for human medicinal products and cosmetics have taken similar action. 35


http://web.archive.org/web/20010624174011/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteg4.htm



(iii) Non-food uses of bovine material. The Committee asked for a note on the use of bovine material for cosmetics in particular, although it might make sense to cover all the non-food uses that we can think of (harp strings, tennis rackets etc). I think that all that is required is a factual note about the range of uses, and quantities, together with an assessment of possible risk factors. It looks to me like a job for Dr Pickles. 1


http://web.archive.org/web/20010624170118/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptee5.htm


http://web.archive.org/web/20010218184950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptec6.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624181038/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptec7.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624173202/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chapteb8.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20030506095053/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/chaptea9.htm



Annex 2 to Chapter 9: Uses made of the cattle carcass

Item Products derived Additional comments

HEAD

Brain Human food Laboratory reagents Veterinary medicines Pharmaceuticals Cosmetics



http://web.archive.org/web/20010218201535/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/glossary.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20020328150145/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/whoswho.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010624175300/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/index.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010221160942/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/volume72.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010221160108/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/volume73.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20030907100258/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/volume74.htm



http://web.archive.org/web/20010221160018/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume7/volume75.htm



4.4 On 10.1.90 I attended the second meeting of the CSM BSE Working Party. The discussions which took place and the conclusions reached can be found in the Minutes of the meeting [YB 90/1.10/1.1-1.24]. I provided comments to Dr Singh in Med TEH on his draft letter to DTI which responded to a request for advice on the safety of the use of bovine offal (in particular, spleen and thymus) in cosmetics [YB 90/1.29/1.1-1.2]. My briefing notes were used to accompany the reply to DTI [YB 90/2.1/4.1]. I indicated I was not happy about the use of bovine offal from calves under 6 months in cosmetics (in contrast to foods) because on damaged skin such use could be close to parenteral administration so the nearest parallel might be injectable medicines. Besides there were no compensating benefits.

57. April 1990

57.1 The formation of SEAC was announced by Mr Gummer on 3.4.90 [YB 90/5.24/4.1-4.2]. As requested, I supplied comments on the draft Agenda prepared by Mr Lowson for SEAC's first meeting [YB 90/4.6/4.1-4.3] and I supplied a list of documents to accompany the formal papers for background information. I offered to put together a discussion paper on bovine eyeballs and the use of bovine material in cosmetics. This draft paper entitled Routes of Possible Transmission into Man was later sent to Mr Lowson for comment [YB 90/4.12/1.1-1.4]. It met with the approval of Mr Lowson but it was not submitted to SEAC at that time as CVO indicated he thought a more detailed paper was needed [YB 90/4.24/3.1-3.2 and see YB 90/4.23/1.1].

http://www.bse.org.uk/witness/htm/stat115.htm

http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=003789727059657&rtmo=weoeinKb&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/96/9/7/wbse07.html


http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=003789727059657&rtmo=weoeinKb&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/99/11/2/nbse02.html


http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=003789727059657&rtmo=weoeinKb&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/00/10/29/nbse129.html


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BSE Inquiry report criticises ex-Tory ministers

Sat, Sep 2, 2000 PA News

Conservative former ministers and Whitehall officials face strong criticism in the official report into the BSE crisis, it was reported tonight. The inquiry chairman Lord Phillips is believed to have notified several former health and agriculture ministers that they are facing criticism in the 13-volume report he is to publish in a few weeks.

Reports in several Sunday newspapers suggested the former ministers would be taken to task for being "too adamant" in their assurances that British beef was safe, and for failing to react swiftly enough to scientists' findings that the disease could spread to humans. Scientists first suspected that there was a risk to humans eating BSE-infected offal in the mid-80s, but it was not until March 1996 that Tory ministers admitted that there was a danger to the public.

But the ex-ministers could come off lightly compared with senior civil servants who ran the two departments as the decade-long saga unfolded.

Lord Phillips' two-year inquiry is said to have concluded that too much importance was attached to the interests of the livestock industry, and not enough to those of consumers. The BSE affair led to a worldwide ban on British beef exports which is estimated to have cost the taxpayer 4.6 billion.

Comment (webmaster): It is unclear why the judge released the findings prior to publication. What purpose is served anyway with polite criticism (1, 2) of long-departed political figures and retired civil servants? Keith Meldrin, who masterminded the coverup within MAFF for 10 years, also receives a wrist-slap for a leading role in 82 human deaths. His successor at MAFF who continued these abominable policies was forced into retirement this year but given a handsome 400,000 pound retirement package. MAFF itself has spent 7 million pounds of public money on lawyers even and successfully fought the Inquiry practise of publishing fulltext of government memos on the Internet.

However, these documents can still be obtained in print form. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas, has obtained many of the documents alluded to in the Inquiry but never released. These have been optically character read into electronic form and distributed to the German BSE listserve archive as well as to this web site:

BSE offals used in cosmetics, toiletry and perfume industry

Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas

Miss Marion Kelly Cosmetic, Toiletry and Perfumery Association 35 Dover Street London W1X3RA

Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1H ONN Enquiries 01-215 5000 Telex 8811074 DTHQ G 01 215 3324 1 February 1990

Dear Marion

As you know there is no record of bovine spongiform encepalopathy crossing to humans, but we need to take precautions to avoid any risk.

There a number of cosmetric products on sale in the United Kingdom such as anti-ageing creams that contain extracts of bovine offal, primarily from spleen and thymus. [Two of the highest risk tissues. Note the epidemic has been raging for 4 years by the time of the non-binding voluntary suggestions here. -- webmaster]

The purpose of this letter is to ask you to ask your members to eliminate any risk by reformulating such products to eliminate these extracts, or alternatively to use material derived from cattle reared outside the UK, Eire or the Channel Islands. [Eire, Channel Islands, and many other countries were thoroughly infected by then -- webmaster]

Please let me know if you have any trouble persuading your members to do so.

Yours sincerely

R J ROSCOE CONSUMER SAFETY UNIT ROOM 407

90/02.01/14.1 ==============

BSE110/1 0080

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY HANNIBAL HOUSE Room No ELEPHANT AND CASTLE LONDON SE1 6TE

1 February 1990

Mr R Roscoe Consumer Affairs Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1

Dear Richard

USE OF BOVINE OFFAL IN COSMETICS

I am replying to your request for advice on the safety of the use of extracts of bovine offal in certain cosmetics, such as skin products claimed to have 'anti-ageing' properties with respect to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). As you are aware there are a number of cosmetic products on sale in the UK that contain small amounts of such extracts, primarily from spleen and thymus.

We accept that the risk of transmission is likely to be remote, but believe that it would be prudent to eliminate any risk by reformulating such products. Alternatively if the incorporation of bovine extracts is retained, material derived from cattle reared outside the UK, Eire or the Channel Islands should be used.

We would be grateful if you would transmit these recommendations to industry via the Trade Association CTPA.

I attach background briefing prepared by medical colleagues from those sections most involved with consideration of BSE in DH, together with a copy of the Southwood report.

Please let me know if you need any further information.

Yours sincerely DR R J FIELDER Enclosure 90/2.1/7.1 ===========

BSE110/1 0081

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

Presence of Bovine Offals in Cosmetics and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

(1) Extracts of bovine spleen and thymus are present at between ca 0.1 and 5% in certain cosmetic preparations, for example certain products claimed to delay the signs of ageing of skin. The concern about the increasing incidence of BSE in cattle in the UK has made it necessary to reconsider the safety of such products.

BSE is a progressive neurological disorder in cattle, which results from infection with an "unconventional viral' agent. The first case was described in cows in 1986. By 19 January 1990 there had been 9436 confirmed cases in the UK on 5474 farms. There are no confirmed cases outside the British Isles, apart from a case in a cow recently exported from England. BSE is one of a family of spongiform encephalopathies which also include scrapie in sheep and kuru and Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (CJD) in man. The infection which leads to BBE appears to have been introduced into cattle from the contaminated feeding stuff, meat and bone meal, made partly from sheep offal: scrapie is endemic in sheep in the UK.

The causative agents of these diseases are thought to be unconventional transmissible agents (referred to variously as prions, virinos, filamentous viruses or slow viruses). They are extremely resistant to most denaturing processes eg heat, UV, high salt concentration, formalin and alkylating agents. The current DH guideline for treating items used on CJD patients is a temperature of 134-138 C (at 2 atmospheres) held for 18 minutes. They are also not removed by normal microbiological filters. It is thus unlikely that the mild processing techniques used to obtain the extracts used in cosmetics would remove the causative agents.

(2) Government action to date includes:

a. An expert working party was set up under Sir Richard Southwood and reported in February 1989. All their recommendations have been acted upon.

b. The disease has been made notifiable in cattle.

c. All suspect animals are slaughtered and carcases destroyed (50% compensation policy but 100% if diagnosis not confirmed); milk from such animals is also destroyed.

d. Sale or supply of animal protein from ruminants for feeding to ruminants prohibited - hopefully to prevent any new infections in cattle. This has had a major effect on the rendering industry.

e. Another committee was set up under Dr David Tyrrell to report on research needs. An interim report was published in January 1990 together with an announcement about additional funding. Much research work into the disease is currently in progress and additional studies are being planned.

Regulations in November 1989 introduced a ban on various bovine offal for human consumption, going wider than the Southwood recommendations which were for such a ban to affect baby food only.

The Medicines Control Agency have gathered information from pharmaceutical companies about use of bovine ingredients in parenteral pharmaceuticals and issued interim guidelines. Many biological products and vaccines use such ingredients. The MCA are considering whether action on specific products is appropriate.

h. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is reviewing its guidance to those who come into direct contact with bovine 'risk' tissues. A press release for those who handle BSE carcases has been issued and one for abattoir workers is in preparation. The HSE ara also discussing risks from BSE exposure with the veterinary profession.

i. All UK cases of CJD will be monitored in a study to be conducted by Dr R G Will in Edinburgh, funded by the Department of Health: this should allow detection of any spread of infection to hummans, although this possibility is considered remote.

(3) Current live issues

Research: Dr Tyrell's interim report identified a large research programme classed as high priority. Almost all of this research falls to MAFF {Central Veterinary Labs} or the AFRC, although the MRC also has an interest. Substantial money has been made available for this work but research will be laborious and results will come slowly.

Food: There has been constant pressure on MAFF about the supposed risk to humans from eating beef and beef products. Infected animals who are incubating the disease but do not show any abnormalities cannot be detected at present and will be entering the human food chain. The offal ban removes the highest 'risk' tissues. Some critics may not be satisfied by this. However, others may argue the action to date is over the top, not demanded by the experts, and illogical since scrapie-infected sheep can still be eaten and doing so for the last 200 years has not caused harm to humans. We expect BSE agent to be resistant to irradiation as applied to food, as well as relatively resistant to cooking.

Other animals: There is no evidence that animals other than cattle (and domesticated, deer) have been or could be affected by BSE, other than experimentally, but there are pressures to extend the ruminant protein ban: at present pigs and poultry receive this sort of feed. Such action, as well as being hard to justify scientifically, would increase costs for the industry and cause perhaps insurmountable problems for abattoirs, who would find renderers no longer willing to accept offal. Many 1000's of tons of offal need to be disposed of daily.

Compensation: This has been set at 50% for BSE, although for some other diseases it is higher. Some critics believe this encourages evasion, with cows affected minimally being sent for human consumption. Even the current level of compensation is proving expensive for MAFF.

Exports: Some foreign countries have banned British exports of seman, embryos and livestock. The EC now no longer accepts live cattle over 6 months of age. The Germans are creating difficulties over beef exports too. The EC are also considering making BSE notifiable and banning ruminant protein feeding to rminants, as we have done here. At present, British meat and bone meat can still be exported and might spread infection overseas (MAFF claim importers have been warned that it is not regarded suitable for feeding to ruminants).

Human transmission: There are some in the media and even the medical profession who are trying to make connections between BSE and the human disorder CJD. There is _no_ evidence of any association nor would we expect any cases by now even were BSE to be transmissible to humans. Dr Wills' study (see 2i above) will monitor the situation for the next decade or two.

I have been asked to provide a draft reply to the attached letter from Sir Richard Southwood to the Minister. The Minister has indicated that we must meet Sir Richard's points (a} on the need for him to be fully briefed as to developments and (b) on the urgency of making progress with the transmission study.

On (a), I would suggest that the draft reply should indicate that you will be in touch with Sir Richard regularly to keep him in the picture. On (b), I hope we can now tell Sir Richard that the arrangements for the purchase and relocation of the animals are under way.

A R Cruickshank 20 June 1989 Mr A J Lawrence AH cc Mr K C Meldrum Dr W A Watson Mr R C Lowson 89/6.20/8.1

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#aaa


update

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out109_en.html


http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out80_en.pdf



P.S. -- one must consider 'accumulation' of agent over time. ...



2009


To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2



I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

P02.35

Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE

Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden

Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.

http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf



Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html



14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/


http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf


http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml



14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.


http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf



Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html



Tuesday, March 16, 2010

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Proof Committee Hansard

RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

[9.03 am]

BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association

CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association

CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?

Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on 14 December last year, that the decision made by the government to allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He states, and rightfully so:

You should be worried. Please let me explain. I’ve kept up with the mad cow saga for 12 years today, on December 14th 1997, some four months post voluntary and partial mad cow feed ban in the USA, I lost my mother to the Heinemann variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). I know this is just another phenotype of the infamous sporadic CJDs. Here in the USA, when USA sheep scrapie was transmitted to USA bovine, the agent was not UK BSE—it was a different strain. So why then would human TSE from USA cattle look like UK CJD from UK BSE? It would not. So this accentuates that the science is inconclusive still on this devastating disease. He goes on to state:

The OIE— the International Organisation of Epizootics, the arm of the WTO— is a failed global agent that in my opinion is bought off via bogus regulations for global trade and industry reps. I have done this all these years for nothing but the truth. I am a consumer, I eat meat, but I do not have to sit idly by and see the ignorance and greed of it all while countless numbers of humans and animals are being exposed to the TSE agents. All the USA is interested in is trade, nothing else matters.

Even Dr Stanley Prusiner, who incidentally won the Nobel Health Prize in 1997 for his work on the prion—he invented the word ‘prion’, or it came from him—states:

The BSC policy was set up for one purpose only, trade—the illegal trading of all strains of TSE globally throughout North America, which is home to CBSC, IBSC and HBSC, many scrapie strains and two strains of CJD to date. (please note typo error, those should have read cBSE, lBSE, and hBSE...tss)

I would also like, while I have the opportunity, to explain the beef-off-the-shelves myth. At the first Senate hearing on 14 December, it was explained that the reason why they allowed BSC beef into Australia was the beef-off-the-shelves policy, whereby if we found a case of BSC in Australia they would have to recall all—

Friday, 5 February 2010 Senate RRA&T 3

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

Senator HEFFERNAN—Which of course is total BS.

Mr Bellinger—Correct. This is written in the FSANZ document—Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Why isn’t this same policy in New Zealand? It is not—it is only in Australia. We are the only country in the world to have this idiotic policy. So we again call for the tabling of the WTO obligations paperwork. We do not believe that exists.

snip...see full text 110 pages ;

http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S12742.pdf



for those interested, please see much more here ;

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2010/03/commonwealth-of-australia-hansard.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/



Thursday, July 08, 2010

Nosocomial transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: results from a risk-based assessment of surgical interventions Public release date: 8-Jul-2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/nosocomial-transmission-of-sporadic.html



Thursday, July 08, 2010

GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/global-clusters-of-creutzfeldt-jakob.html



TSS